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  ABSTRACT 
World Trade Organization (WTO) is the largest trade organization which is supposed 
to open the international trade for the benefit of all countries through liberalization or 
removing impediments over trade. It may directly impact import and export and 
indirectly other macroeconomic variables. In this context, Azerbaijan’s accession 
process to WTO has been subject to many discussions in terms of what impacts are 
expected for the economy in case of the accession. This thesis attempts to do an 
empirical analysis of the expected macroeconomic impacts of the membership on 
Azerbaijan economy through application of VAR model.  
In this thesis, central question is what overall macroeconomic impact is expected for 
Azerbaijan’s economy if Azerbaijan join to WTO. In this context, I hypothesize that 
macroeconomic impact of the membership over Azerbaijan economy is expected to 
be negative. To test my hypothesis, I benefit from the membership experience of 
Georgia and Armenia and use VAR model to estimate time series data for Georgia 
and Armenia individually, and panel data consisted of Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan’s time series data. After all, I conclude that WTO membership increases 
import much more than export. However, the research fails to find enough evidence 
to say that overall impact of WTO membership is statistically significant. After 
taking Azerbaijan’s economic characteristics into consideration, the research 
concludes that overall macroeconomic impact of WTO membership is expected to be 
negative for Azerbaijan. 
Keywords: Azerbaijan, WTO membership, Macroeconomic impacts, VAR model 
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ÖZ 
Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (DTÖ) dünyanın en büyük ticaret örgütü olarak uluslararası 
ticaret üzerindeki engellerin kaldırılması veticari kazanç imkanlarının tüm üye 
ülkelere açılmasını hedeflemektedir. DTÖ, üyeülkelerin ihracat ve ithalatları 
üzerinde direkt, diğer makroiktisadi göstergeler üzerindeyse indirekt etkilerinin 
olacaği ön görülmektedir. Bu etkilerin hem positif, hem de negatif olabileceği göz 
önüne alındığında Azerbaycanın bu örgüte üyelik süreci, ve üyelikten sonra 
beklenilen makroekonomik etkiler bir dizi müzakerelere konu olmuştur. Bu araştırma 
konuya empirik açıdan yaklaşıp VAR modelini kullanarak Azerbaycanın DTÖ’e 
üyeliğinin gerçekleşmesi halinde beklenen makroekonomik etkileri bulmayi 
hedeflemiştir.  
Bu tezin cevabını bulmaya çalıştığı en önemli soru üyelik gerçekleşirse Azerbaycan  
ekonomisi için ne gibi makroekonomik sonuçlar doğuracağıdır. Tezde kurulan 
hipotez çerçevesinde beklenen etkilerin negatif olacağı tahmin edilmektedir. Bu 
hipotezi test etmek için DTÖ üyesi olan Gürcistan ve Ermenistanın tecrübelerinden 
yararlanılarak VAR modeli kullanılmış, bu şekilde hem her iki ülkenin 
makroekonomin göstergeleri üyelik öncesi ve sonrasında yalnız olarak 
değerleğerlendirilmiş, hem de Gürcistan, Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan’ın 
makroeconomik göstergelerinin panel data olarak değerlendirilmesi yapılmıştır. 
Sonuç olarak DTÖ üyeliğinin ithalatı ihracattan daha fazla artırdığı tespit edilmiş, 
ancak üyeliğin genel etkisinin istatiksel olarak anlamlı olması için yeterli kanıt 
bulunamamıştır. Buna rağmen, Azerbaycan’ın kendine has ekonomik 
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özelliklerideğerlendirilmeye katıldığında üyeliğin gerçekleşmesi durumunda genel 
etkinin negatif olacağı tahmininin doğru olduğu kanaatine varılmıştır. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Azerbaycan, DTÖ üyeliği, Makroekonomic etkiler, VAR model  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, WTO is the largest trade organization in the world including most of the 
world countries. It has a long founding story which starts in the second half of 1940s 
or more precisely, by signing the GATT agreement. During the all these years, 
GATT agreement has been subject to many trade negotiations and changed to GATT 
1994 when WTO was created. Aim of the organization is enhancing trade 
liberalization and opening trade to all countries to benefit. The organization has 
several compulsory principles that must be followed by all member countries. On the 
other hand, a country who wants to join to the organization passes several stages and 
undertakes obligations for the WTO until its accession as a full member. 
Azerbaijan’s accession process to WTO is one of such a case which has been started 
in 1997 but, not completed yet.  
Although WTO is a world organization covering most of the world trade, it has been 
subject to many researches and discussions in terms of whether its impact on 
international trade and economies of the countries is significant or not. This became 
more popular with Rose’s findings (Rose 2004a) through which he claimed that there 
is not “strong empirical evidence” to consider that “GATT/WTO has systematically 
played a strong role in encouraging trade”. Consequently, that leaded to further 
studies in this field which by using different methods achieved different results 
where some criticized and some supported WTO. On the other hand, studies about 
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the impact of trade liberalization over the economic growth of countries, which WTO 
membership is supposed to increase also produced different results. However, 
general conclusion is that a country may suffer from balance of payments deficit if 
the increase in import exceeds the increase in export after liberalizing its trade 
continuously.  
In this context, this thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the WTO and 
the effects of membership that a nonmember country such as Azerbaijan should take 
into consideration. The main research question is “what kind of macroeconomic 
impacts are expected for Azerbaijan economy in case of its accession to WTO”. 
Excluding political factors, the thesis discusses and graphically analysis trends in 
macroeconomic indicators of Azerbaijan economy after the year 1994. Moreover, 
this study includes discussing trends in some macroeconomic indicators of both 
Georgia and Armenia as the member countries of WTO. Analyzing Georgia and 
Armenia economies in before-and-after WTO membership context is supposed to 
create a general impression about what macroeconomic impacts may be expected for 
Azerbaijan economy in case of its accession. This analysis has been carried out 
graphically and empirically.  
To estimate possible macroeconomic impacts of the accession for Azerbaijan, the 
research employs Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models for Georgia and Armenia 
individually and a panel data which include macroeconomic indicators of Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. VAR model is applied on non-stationary and stationary 
time series data, separately.    
The thesis is organized as follows:  
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Chapter 2 gives information to understand WTO and Azerbaijan’s accession process 
to this organization. Firstly, I explain historical foundation process of the 
GATT/WTO in light of reasons to the establishment and round of negotiations. 
Secondly, I look through the legal basis of GATT/WTO in terms of the main 
agreements such as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Therefore, this enables one to define what 
restrictions and privileges the membership at WTO ensures for member states. 
Thirdly, I try to specify the theoretical base for foundation of the WTO according to 
previous studies related to this field. Later I discuss general accession procedure for 
WTO membership and at last, Azerbaijan’s accession process in historical context 
with causes of delaying.  
Chapter 3 covers previous studies on the impact of WTO over international trade and 
the impact of trade liberalization as a result of WTO membership over 
macroeconomic situation (economic growth, trade imbalances). Both criticizers’ and 
supporters’ studies about WTO are evaluated briefly. More precisely, the researches 
that find no significant impact of WTO (Rose 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Gowa and Kim 
2005; Park 2009; Eicher and Henn 2011; Roy 2011; Swinnen, Olper and 
Vandemoortele 2012) are discussed as parallel to the studies of the supporters of 
WTO (Subramanian and Wei 2007; Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers 2007a, 2007b; 
Balding 2010; Liu 2009; Dutt, Zandtand Mihov 2013; Konya, Matyas and Harris 
2011; Kim 2008; Grant and Boys 2012; Herzl and Warner2011; Chang and Lee 
2011; Anderson2010; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008; Jansen 2010; Buthe and 
Milner2008; Shah, Hasnat and Li 2010).  
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In chapter 4, I discuss the macroeconomic performance of Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Georgia economies during the transition period. Azerbaijan economy is studied in 
more detail within three separated period: Recession (1991-1994), Restructuring 
(1995-2005), and Oil boom (after 2005) in terms of economic growth and growth 
performance in agriculture, manufacturing, industry, services, inflation and current 
account balance. Later, I give a graphical analysis of time series trends in GDP, 
sectoral production, export and import of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia 
economies. Azerbaijan economy is analyzed in both oil-and-gas and non-oil-and-gas 
gas context.  
Chapter 5 specifies the methodology for the empirical part of this thesis and indicates 
the sources of data which were used for estimation. In this part, Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test is used to test whether time series are stationary or not.  Pairwise 
Granger Causality Test is used to find out the existence of granger causality between 
WTO membership and other variables in the models. Moreover, t test is used to find 
out if the coefficients are statistically significant. 
In chapter 6, results of tests and VAR models are presented and interpreted.  
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Chapter 2 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:FOUNDING, 
LEGAL BASIS, MAIN PRINCIPLES, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, AZERBAIJAN’S CASE 
2.1 Founding of the World Trade Organization 
World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in January 1, 1995, after the eight 
years of Uruguay Round of negotiations on the basis of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). More precisely, WTO is considered as the successor of 
GATT and mainly based on the principles of GATT. Therefore, signing of the GATT 
should be considered as the first stage in creation of WTO.  
The idea of GATT was derived from the Bretton Woods system and its was purposed 
to increasing the living standards, achieving the full employment, continuous rising 
of real income and effective demand, the “full use” of world resources and 
enlargement of goods production / trade through decreasing the tariff and non-tariff 
barriers over trade as well as removing of discriminatory trade policies in 
international trade in context of “reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements” (Irwin, 1995, p. 324). Although liberalization of international trade 
was considered as an essential tool to attain the monetary stability and full 
employment in the world, there was less attention to establish an International Trade 
Organization (ITO) until 1947 or signing of the GATT (Irwin, 1995, p. 325). 
In 1947, first round of negotiations within the GATT with participation of 23 
countries, by which 80% of total world trade was held, was organized in Geneva and 
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devoted to reducing the tariff over trade. All participators were enforced to decrease 
their tariff levels over trade in the context of Most-Favored Nation (MFN) principle 
(maintaining equal conditions for all countries in trade). As a result of negotiations 
USA decreased its tariff levels by 35% on the average and became the leader in tariff 
cuts within Geneva round (Irwin, 1995, p. 325). That is why J. Pauwelyn (2005) in 
his article “The Transformation of World trade” has called the initial GATT as “a 
gentlemen's club” rather than a legal system with the intention of determining the 
problems over trade instead of making or explaining the trade law.  
However, it should be noted that USA had increased its tariffs from 38% to 52% by 
“the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act” in 1930 (Bagwell and Staiger, 2003, p. 14). 
Therefore, this “gentleman” action of USA in Geneva round of negotiations can be 
understood as decreasing the earlier increased tariffs. The enforcement mechanism of 
GATT was much more likely a “diplomatic procedure” aimed to preserve the 
“balance of concession” which was unable to provide objective enforcement of 
GATT rules and GATT was described as poor of discipline and law over the politics 
(Pauwelyn, 2005, pp. 13-14).  
After Geneva round (1947), the negotiations within GATT were followed by new 
rounds, which were focused on the problems of trade as well. Thus, the level of 
tariffs were discussed in Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956) and Dillon 
(1960-1961) rounds of negotiations and after them Kennedy round (1964-1967) 
included anti-dumping issues and Tokyo round (1973-1979) added non-tariff 
measures and framework agreements into the list of subjects (Oatley, 2008, p. 26). 
Uruguay round (1986-1993) within GATT expanded the range of subjects to include 
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services, intellectual property rights, textiles and clothing, agriculture, dispute 
settlement and hence to the creation of WTO (Oatley, 2008, p. 26). 
In Kennedy round of negotiations, “anti-dumping” was included into the GATT 
agreement. Thus, the importer countries may impose “anti-dumping duties” over the 
imported products which supposed to be subject to damping as defined in Article VI 
of GATT 1994. As mentioned in the Article, the offered price of an imported product 
must be under the real value of that good in the exporter country in order to consider 
the case of damping. On the other hand, Tokyo round played an essential role in 
defining the developing and extending rules over the non-tariff measures as part of 
GATT’s aim which was mentioned as decreasing or removing of non-tariff barriers 
and introducing those kinds of measures under the international discipline (WTO, 
2012, p. 42).  
Another important outcome of Tokyo round was signing some agreements aimed to 
develop the “systemic functioning” of GATT as the basic rules on multilateral trade 
system: “Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller 
Participation of Developing Countries”, “Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for 
Balance of Payments Purposes”, “Safeguard Actions for Development Purposes” and 
the “Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance” (USITC, 2003, pp. 20-21). All these were also called as framework 
agreements within the GATT.  
Afterwards, Uruguay round added the services and intellectual property issues into 
the sphere of influence of GATT’s main rules, decreased barriers on trade of services 
and adopted a “Final Act” about the ‘protection of intellectual property’ by all parties 
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on the basis of Most Favored Nation principle that national governments were 
requested to treat all member countries equally and ensure the protection of 
intellectual property (Fieleke, 1995, pp. 10-14).  
Uruguay round was the last round of negotiations within GATT, which is well 
known with creating the WTO on the basis of GATT. It considerably extended the 
scope of subjects within GATT which leaded to the establishment of international 
trade organization. The main reason in creation of WTO was that GATT was based 
on goods trade while WTO included trade in services and protection of intellectual 
property in context of its agreements as well (WTO, 2011, p.10).  
Uruguay round ended with signing the “Marrakesh Protocol to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994” on April 15, 1994 which added all outcomes 
of negotiations within GATT into this final agreement, called as the “GATT 1994”. 
In addition to GATT 1994, “Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization” included many other agreements such as General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATT), Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  
On November 2001, Doha Round of negotiations began on the subjects of 
agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA), services, trade facilitation, 
rules, the environment, intellectual property issues, dispute settlement which were all 
targeted to increase market access in a simplified manner, maintaining protection of 
intellectual property rights and environment and making the Dispute Settlement of 
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WTO much more understandable (WTO, a). Although Doha round was planned to 
end in 2005 negotiations in context of this round still continue in 2013.  
To sum up, WTO is an outcome of long-lasting negotiations within GATT. In its 
mission statement, WTO was defined as an “international organization whose 
primary purpose is to open trade for the benefit of all” (WTO, b). It takes a broad 
range of activities on solving trade problems and making markets much more 
accessible for all participants of trade within WTO.  
2.2 Legal Basis of the WTO: Agreements 
As mentioned above, WTO was established on the basis of GATT. However, the 
legal basis of WTO is the “Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round 
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization” which includes many agreements in itself. The main principles 
of WTO are based on mainly three agreements: General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Agreement on 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  
GATT 1994 included the all rules of GATT 1947 and all protocols and certifications 
about tariff privileges as well as all other decisions adopted by participated countries 
which all were about the trade in goods (GATT, 1994). This agreement restricted the 
foreign trade policy tools of member countries. Article I.1 demanded from 
governments of member countries to maintain equal conditions for all similar 
products from whole member states that any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity for a product must be granted to all others immediately as well (GATT, 
1994). In addition, Article III of the agreement imposes member countries to ensure 
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the “equality of competitive conditions” in internal market for both imported and 
domestic goods that domestic measures should not be aimed to protect domestic 
producers (GATT, 1994).  
In compliance with GATT 1994, member countries must provide the same 
conditions for the ‘traffic in transit’ of all members, without any discrimination for 
production place and ‘flag of vessels’ (Article V) as well as customs valuation 
(Article VII). In addition, the ‘freedom of transit’ should be ensured within borders 
of any parties in terms of the best international routes for the transit. Article VI 
defined the framework of dumping and the policy toward anti-dumping in terms of 
“countervailing duties” which could be applied by and against all members of the 
organization. Article VIII of GATT 1994 emphasized that the import and export 
tariffs should be about the amount of custom services and must not be used as 
‘indirect protection’ of domestic producers as well as ‘fiscal purposes’.  
Moreover, member countries were obliged to publish any changes in their trade 
regulations to inform other countries as well as importers and exporters (Article X), 
remove application of quantitative restrictions over import and export for different 
purposes (Article XI-XII), apply non-discriminatory quantitative restrictions in case 
of its application (Article XIII), inform all member countries about the subsidization 
in detailed form if a country uses any kind of subsidy as well as “income or price 
support” (Article XVI) (GATT, 1994). However, member countries were allowed to 
use the flexible tariff rates in order to support the creation and development of a 
special industry which all are aimed to maintain the economic development of that 
member country (Article XVIII) (GATT, 1994).  
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Article XXIV of GATT 1994 is also very crucial for the foreign trade policy of 
member countries, which define the framework of creating the customs unions and 
free-trade areas among members themselves. However, this article imposes on 
member countries that their trade regulations and duties must not be “more 
restrictive” in case of their membership to customs unions and free trade areas than 
the level of restriction through duties and trade regulations before the creation of 
those unions and areas (GATT, 1994).   
On the other hand, GATS was purposed to create the ‘multilateral framework of 
principles and rules’ over the service trade among member countries of WTO in 
order to stimulate the economic growth and development of all parties as well as 
developing member states (GATS). Thus, this agreement imposes on members to 
create the equal conditions over the trade in services in the context of Most Favored-
Nation principle regardless the identity of service suppliers or the country (Article II) 
as well as maintaining transparency of everything related to all measures within this 
agreement (Article III). In addition, all members take the responsibility of providing 
the objective and fair application of the measures over trade in services as mentioned 
in GATS (Article VI).  
Moreover, each member of the WTO is responsible to remove monopoly if there is, 
over service trade within its market and treat as consistent with responsibilities of 
members under the GATS (Article VIII). In addition, member countries are not 
allowed to impose restrictions over the “international transfers and payments” for 
actual transactions in context of special obligations out of permitted restrictions on 
service trade as only in case of critical balance of payments and foreign financial 
problems (Article XI-XII). On the other hand, member countries are constrained to 
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apply limitations over the market access in terms of restrictions over the amount of 
service suppliers, total worth and amount of service operations (Article XVI) which 
they are obliged to treat against foreign service suppliers as equal with their own in 
terms of national treatment (Article XVII)(GATS).   
TRIPS is another main agreement of WTO which is aimed to encourage the 
protection of intellectual property rights in member countries through providing rules 
and methods. Thus, members of WTO are forced to maintain the protection of 
intellectual property rights as much as demanded with this agreement through any 
eligible method in accordance with their own law (Article I) (TRIPS). In addition, 
they are obliged to treat equally against both national and foreigners in terms of 
protection of intellectual property rights as well as to create the same conditions for 
all property owners of other member countries (Article III-IV) (TRIPS). Moreover, 
member states are responsible to provide a law which should cover ‘enforcement 
procedures’ defined by this agreement in order to use against infraction of 
intellectual property rights as well as to include the quick solution for these cases but 
these procedures should not impose barriers over the legal trade (Article XLI) 
(TRIPS). Thus, these procedures should be ‘fair and equitable’ against all parties and 
should not become needlessly complex, time-consuming, expensive and 
delay(Article XLI) (TRIPS).  
In addition to GATT, GATS and TRIPS, there are several other multilateral 
agreements within WTO which are mainly related to the trade in goods and define 
measures in connection with the trade in goods. Agreements on Agriculture, the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Textiles and Clothing, 
Technical Barriers to Trade, Pre-shipment Inspection, Rules of Origin, Import 
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Licensing Procedures, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Safeguards and 
Trade-related Investment Measures specify the certain measures over the 
corresponding fields of trade or the measures in specific subjects.  
However, the legal documents which were mentioned above are only a small part of 
whole WTO legal texts. WTO legal texts include approximately 60 agreements and 
decisions which are 550 pages in total. Some of these are related to the interpretation 
of previous agreements or certain articles of GATT. Although all these constitute the 
legal framework of WTO, some disputes still rise among the members of 
organization which is tried to resolve through Dispute Settlement System within 
WTO. We will discuss this system in the next subchapter. 
2.3 Does Mission of WTO Comply With Economic Theory?  
There are different approaches to the creation of WTO as the successor of GATT. 
Some scholars explain why the GATT was created in context of hegemonic stability 
theory and some others approach to this issue from the economic point of view on 
the basis of comparative cost advantage theory. 
Hegemonic stability theory is used to explain the success and failure of international 
cooperation in the certain conditions which argues that existence of a strong 
dominant actor in global politics causes to ‘collectively desirable’ results in terms of 
ensuring public goods for whole participants of the international system (Snidal, 
1985, pp. 579-580). However, J. Ford (2002) claims that hegemonic state takes the 
advantage of “regime norms” in order to access to the markets of all thecountries and 
to ensure maximum level of profit for its “bourgeois class” through exploiting other 
states under the excuse of global utility (p. 120).    
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Although neo-liberals consider GATT as an international public good in the context 
of hegemonic stability theory, it is the fact that GATT was mainly based on the 
interests of main industrial countries in alliance with USA and therefore, it should be 
considered as a trade system which was created within an alliance rather than a world 
free trade system (Walter, 1996). Thus, the reciprocal security interdependence 
encouraged the liberalization of trade among USA and Western European countries 
(Walter, 1996). Consequently, this makes suspicious the considering of GATT as a 
public good provided by the hegemonic state in context of hegemonic stability 
theory.  
From a different perspective, founding of the GATT/WTO refers to the “static 
version of the theory of comparative cost advantage (CCA)” which supports 
international free trade (Shafaeddin, 2010, p. 176). However, the CCA theory was 
considered “strongly biased” because of the influence of classical theorists of 
international trade as well as their neo-liberal successors as supporters of free trade 
and trade liberalization at the international level (Shafaeddin, 2010, p. 176). CCA 
theory claims that international free trade is the best but, its assumptions are 
considered as “unrealistic” (Shafaeddin, 2010, pp. 176-177).  
However, observing the import of absolutely advantaged goods in some cases due to 
use the factors of production in production of “more-valuable goods” which AAC 
could not explain caused to emerging of comparative advantage theory that despite 
of absolute advantage situation, some goods should be imported from less productive 
countries in order to employ the factors of production in more more-valuable goods’ 
production (Fletcher, 2010, p. 94). The CCA theory assume that “trade is 
sustainable”, “there are no externalities”, “factors of production move easily between 
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industries”, “trade does not raise income inequality”, “capital is not internationally 
mobile”, “short-term efficiency causes long-term growth” and “trade does not induce 
adverse productivity growth abroad” which all are suspicious (Fletcher, 2010, p. 97-
104).  Therefore, new models were established in order to explain the CCA.  
Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) model explains the comparative cost advantage among states 
in context of “factor endowments” of each state which define two factors of 
production - labor and capital- and stresses that the country is comparatively 
advantaged in production of labor based goods if it is labor abundant and another 
country has comparative cost advantage on capital based goods if it is capital 
abundant (Oatley, 2008, pp. 59-60). However, this model failed to explain the 
situation in foreign trade of USA after World War II. Thus, Leontief found out that 
the import competing goods of USA are much more capital based than its exports to 
the world which was called as Leontief paradox and as a solution, he offered to 
include the “qualitative” distinctions among labor factor in two different countries of 
the model (Rahim, 1999, p. 94). From this point of view, a worker in USA could be 
considered as equal to more than one worker of another country in context of 
qualitative distinctions which could make USA labor abundant as opposite to H-O 
model.   
On the other hand, Stolper-Samuelson emphasized that under assumptions of ceteris 
paribus and factor mobility among sectors of economy, the abundant factor in an 
economy will enjoy from freer trade and other factor of production with relatively 
lower amount will support protection which trade policy can raise the real income of 
people who owe the abundant factors of production “more than proportionally” (Alt, 
Gilligan, 2000, p. 330).  
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Consequently, this will lead to decline of the production of labor intensive goods and 
increase of the capital based goods production. This will increase the real income of 
factors’ owners which have been used in production of capital based goods and vice 
versa. Although the amount of used factors will decrease in labor intensive goods 
production, this theorem assumes that they will move and be used in the production 
of capital intensive goods in context of factor mobility among sectors of economy. 
However, the Ricardo-Viner model brought the notion of “specific factors” and 
emphasized that the factors of production “can not move” among different sectors of 
economy that those factors are “specific” for that sector (Alt, Gilligan, 2000, p. 332). 
More precisely, specific factors of production can move in some degree but, they will 
lose their value that “specificity” implies.   
All these theories and models try to explain the free trade and specialization in 
context of static CCA of a country whereas some other scholars do not consider this 
as necessary that “dynamic comparative advantage” may be attained by government 
support and intervention within a certain time period (Shafaeddin, 2010, p.177). This 
also resembles the claim of Samuelson that “some trade is better than no trade, but 
this does not mean that free trade is always the best” (Shafaeddin, 2010, p.177).  
To sum up, there are theoretically different approaches to the creation of 
GATT/WTO. Some scholars try to interpret it as political outcome and some others 
explain it in the context of CCA theory. However, hegemonic stability theory seems 
to be better in lighting this issue which both static and dynamic version of CCA fails 
to suggest the free trade as the “best” for all countries. Therefore, the aim of 
GATT/WTO becomes suspicious in terms of ensuring more liberal trade through 
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removing of all barriers over trade in order to make all countries better off at least 
theoretically.  
2.4 Main Principles of GATT/WTO 
WTO is a trade organization that creates the framework of trade policies but it does 
not indicate the results of these policies. Thus, the organization is described as a 
“table” around which people discuss certain issues (WTO, 2011, p. 9). However, 
there are some principles that help to understanding of WTO/GATT agreements. 
Thus, Bernard Hoekman specifies five main principles such as “nondiscrimination”, 
“reciprocity”, “enforceable commitments”, “transparency” and “safety valves” which 
have special importance in understanding of either GATT (until 1994) and WTO 
agreements (Hoekman, 2002, p. 42).  
Under the principle of nondiscrimination, member states accept to impose the same 
level of tariffs on imported goods from all other members of the organization 
(Bagwell, Staiger, 1999, p. 217). This means that applied tariffs level of a member 
country (USA) is the same on import of a product (textile) from all participants of 
WTO, without any discrimination. Nondiscriminatory behavior in GATT agreement 
includes two main principles which are emphasized in Articles of the agreement: 
“General Most Favored Nation” (MFN) as mentioned in Article I and “National 
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation” as indicated in Article III 
(Srinivasan, 2005, p. 72).  
Thus, MFN principle demands that a member country must treat equally against 
products of all other WTO members during the import of those products in terms of 
imposed tariff levels, privileges and any other kind of granted advantages. On the 
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other hand, another principle requires application of the same level of taxes and other 
regulations on imported products of other member states with the domestic products 
of a member in its internal market.  
The reciprocity is another fundamental principle of GATT that a country admits to 
decrease the degree of its protection over trade as a response to the “reciprocal 
concession” from another country as its commercial partner which this implies the 
“ideal” level of reciprocal shifts in trade policy of different countries that leads to the 
approximately same shifts in amount of imports between trade partners (Bagwell, 
Staiger, 1999, pp. 216-217). Obviously, this is the key principle of tariff negotiations 
where participants try to achieve a “balance of concessions” that joining to 
negotiations is optional and requires willingness to set “reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous” decreased level of tariffs (Bagwell, Staiger, 1999, p. 225). More 
precisely, if two country (suppose USA and China) enter tariff negotiations, both of 
them are interested in mutually reducing of their tariff levels on products of each 
other. Thus, if the tariff concession between these two countries is “ideal”, their 
amount of import from each other will change proportionally to the level of changes 
in tariff levels in terms of the achieved concession.  
Application of reciprocity principle is observed in GATT/WTO when members of 
the organization legally desire to “renegotiate” the signed agreement in context of 
Article XXVIII of GATT which mentions that any member can suggest changes to 
previously agreed tariff concession or “withdraw” that concession. In these cases, if 
that country can not get success in negotiations about the “renegotiated tariff 
schedule” with other member countries, it can independently impose its suggested 
changes to tariffs and other countries are also allowed to withdraw approximately 
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same level of their concession as a response to that country under the reciprocity 
principle (Bagwell, Staiger, 1999, p. 228).  
‘Bindings and enforceable commitment’s is another principle which refer to the 
implementation of tariff commitments by member countries (Article II) which a 
WTO member can not impose tariffs higher than bound level or the highest level of 
allowed applicable tariffs  without renegotiating this issue with other members, non-
tariff commitments (Article VII, XI) that forbids the application of non-tariff 
measures such as quantitative restrictions over import and other commitments of 
agreed documents (Hoekman, 2002, p. 43). Thus, if a member observe that another 
member does not implement its commitments or its attitudes does not comply with 
the principles and rules of WTO, firstly it can raise this issue at the government of 
another state and if the complaining state does not become gratified by the actions of 
another state’s government, it can take this case to WTO for WTO dispute settlement 
procedures in order to determine whether this is the violation of WTO or not 
(Hoekman, 2002, p. 43). Obviously, WTO rules and commitments donot work 
sufficiently if the member countries are not forced to implement those rules and 
commitments.  
The transparency principle has also crucial role in WTO activities in terms of 
ensuring stable and predictable trade law arrangements of WTO members which the 
“rule-oriented” external trade policy is based on this principle as well that includes 
both publishing of all appropriate arrangements in order to make them achievable for 
all parties before their implementation and notifying WTO and all other members 
about the actions of its government by a member country (Matsushita, 2004, p. 368). 
Thus, Article X of GATT 1994, Article III of GATS and Article LXIII of TRIPS as 
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well as other agreements of WTO ensures the transparency rules for the activities of 
WTO and its member countries (Matsushita, 2004, p. 368). Therefore, transparency 
principle of WTO demands that all regulations and commitments of member 
countries as well as WTO itself must be made available for all parties and public. In 
this sense, if a member country intends to change the tariffs level, firstly it must 
publish this arrangement for the public and only after this it can be applied.  
Although all principles that we discussed above serve to support the free 
international trade, last principle has an opposite effect over free trade. Thus, safety 
valves principle authorizes governments of member states to “restrict trade” in some 
conditions in order to providing fair competition, achieve its “non-economic 
objectives” and interfere in trade because of economic causes (Reis, 2009, p. 49). 
Governments restrict the trade in case of dumping in order to maintain fair 
competition in trade. In addition, non-economic objectives of a government can be 
protection of national security, public health and heavily injured industries with the 
effect of imported goods which governments are allowed to restrict the trade for. 
Moreover, if governments face with severe balance of payments difficulties or are 
interested in development of an infant industry, WTO agreements allow to restriction 
of the trade in some level as well.  
After all, we conclude that although the aim of WTO is creating freer trade in the 
world which its most of principles serve for this aim, it also supports the protective 
actions of national governments in some cases. However, this raises the question that 
whether such kind of actions are really required for that country or if restrictions of a 
government under safety valves principle is fair or not. Consequently, this causes 
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disputes among different countries which will be discussed in the context of dispute 
settlement system of WTO.   
2.5 General Accession Process to WTO: Step by Step 
WTO is open for accession of new members into the organization. It is the largest 
trade organization in the world with 159 members according to data of March, 2013 
which provides both benefits and costs to the member countries. Despite some costs 
and independent trade policy restrictions, many countries also attempt to obtain the 
membership status in the organization, such that 24 more countries are on the way of 
accession to WTO as well. In this sense, it would be better to discuss the expected 
benefits and costs of the accession for potential WTO members before discussing the 
accession process itself.  
Membership to WTO ensures some advantages such as much more trading 
opportunities with WTO members, higher level of transparency of policies over the 
trade, more reliable and presumable situation for the trade, rights to benefit from the 
advantages of WTO agreements, accession to dispute settlement mechanism of WTO 
in order to assert their trade rights and national interests and participation rights in 
multilateral trade negotiations of WTO (Ognivtsev and Jounela and Tang, 2001, pp. 
176-177). Thus, accession to WTO provides broad range of benefits at least 
theoretically and in this sense, non-member countries seek to become a full member 
of WTO.  
However, WTO is not all about benefits or advantages in terms of WTO principles 
and obligations by members of the organization. Thus, the membership causes some 
difficulties, especially for small states in terms of costs derived from the compliance 
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to WTO as well as decreasing of the policy autonomy (Wangdi, 2010, p. 56). Thus, 
new members take responsibilities to make their trade policies compatible with the 
principles of WTO and this means loss of trade policy independence. On the other 
hand, states face with the strong competition of advanced economies after their 
accession, especially in agricultural goods and this is the main source of concerns of 
developing countries.       
Despite of some disadvantages of WTO membership, world countries are interested 
in accession to the organization. The accession procedure was specified in the 
document “Accession to the WTO - Procedures for Negotiations under Article XII” 
that defines the framework of a non-member’s accession process to WTO (Williams, 
2008). However, a country can obtain an observer status for five years in WTO in 
order to become well informed about WTO as well as its activities before its 
accession as a member (Markovic, 2009, pp. 118-119). This status does not impose 
any commitment on that country. Figure 1.1 represents general framework of an 
accession process. 
In short, membership procedure of a country includes six staged accession process 
(Markovic, 2009, p. 119). As mentioned in the figure above, procedure starts with 
official request submission by the government of the candidate country. This request 
must indicate the desire of that country to accept the Marrakesh Agreement and to 
become a member of WTO, which should be submitted to the WTO’s General 
Director. Afterwards the request is introduced to all members of WTO and included 
to the agenda of General Council’s subsequent meeting.  
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Figure 2.1  Accession process to WTO  
Source: WTO 
If the membership request of the country is adopted in the meeting of General 
Council, a Working Party is formed for this accession in order to look through the 
application of that country which all WTO members can participate in working 
parties (WTO).  In the next stage, applicant country has to submit a “Memorandum 
on the Foreign Trade Regime” in order to clarify its policies and institutions which 
covers the explanation of its economic policies as well as external trade of goods and 
services, “trade-related intellectual property regime”, agreements on the economic 
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integration with other countries, “investments”, “decision-making process” and 
statistical supplement (Eromenko, 2010, p. 43). 
The statistical supplement includes data about the applicant country’s trade, statutory 
acts, external trade agreements, surveys on “import licensing and customs valuation 
procedures”, state enterprises in trade, technical restrictions over  trade, “sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures”, government support and subsidization of export in 
Agriculture, services trade as well as “trade related aspects of intellectual property 
rights” (Markovic, 2009, p. 120). Therefore, this memorandum is very important for 
the accession process that it constitutes the ground of future negotiations. Moreover, 
the applicant country presents an “Initial Schedule for Tariff Concessions for Goods” 
and an “Initial Schedule on Specific Commitments in Services” for WTO members 
as well (Markovic, 2009, pp. 120-121).  
This is followed by bilateral negotiations among WTO members and the applicant 
country and if all negotiations are successfully ended, the WTO Secretariat formulate 
the “Accession Package” which include the “Working Party Report”, “Protocol of 
Accession”, the “Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods” and the 
“Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services” (Eromenko, 2010, p. 44). 
After all, if the Accession Package is accepted in the last meeting of Working party 
and confirmed by General Council of the Ministerial Conference, the applicant 
country approves the Protocol of Accession and obtains full membership status in 
WTO within the following one month. 
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2.6 WTO Dispute Settlement System 
As it is mentioned above, one of the reasons which encourage countries to join WTO 
is the opportunity to defend themselves or their trade interests in the international 
arena. Thus, they are allowed to bring cases to the Dispute Settlement system or 
more precisely Dispute Settlement body at WTO after their accession to the 
organization. In this sense, it is interesting to understand the dispute settlement 
mechanism of WTO and its effectiveness for developing countries. 
Legally, dispute settlement system is based on the “Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes” as the principal agreement on 
dispute settling which is the result of Uruguay Round as a part of the WTO 
agreement (WTO). However provisions on the dispute settlement within WTO were 
also emphasized in GATT 1994 (Articles XXII-XXIII), General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (Articles XXII-XXIII) as well as in agreements on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (Article 64), Implementation of Article VI of GATT 
1994 or Anti-Dumping Agreement (Article 17), Implementation of Article VII of 
GATT 1994 or Customs Valuation Agreement (Article 19), Preshipment Inspection 
(Articles 7-8), Agriculture (Article 19), Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (Article 11), Textiles and Clothing (Article 8.10), Technical Barriers to 
Trade (Article 14), Trade-Related Investment Measures (Article 8), Rules of Origin 
(Articles 7-8), Import Licensing Procedures (Article 6), Safeguards (Article 14) and 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Article 4 and 30) (WTO, 2004, pp. 28-29).  
Today, WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is authorized to implement the 
requirements of dispute settlement system which include all members countries’ 
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representatives and governs disputes among members of the organization. The 
disputes are brought to the DSB by governments of member countries if they think 
that another member country infringes the principles of WTO. In this sense, DSB 
initiates a settlement process for the brought dispute, which may take a long time 
period such as even 2-3 years. Because this is a too large topic and not much 
important for this research, we will not explain stages of a dispute settlement process 
with details. Thus, the focus of this part is much more on the effectiveness of dispute 
settlement process for developing countries.  
Although WTO is supposed to maintain the equal opportunities to benefit from its 
principles for all member countries, it may be asked whether developing countries 
can really use this system to accomplish its economic interests or not. In this sense, 
theoretically WTO does this and even, it ensures some special treatments for them 
such as legal assistance and exclusive dispute settlement procedures in terms of 
quick settlement process and stimulating other countries to consider the situation of 
developing, especially least-developed countries (WTO, 2004, p. 111). However, all 
these are theoretically and even if all these would be maintained, there are still 
weaknesses of the Dispute settlement system in terms of developing country 
perspective.   
Thus, despite of settling disputes regard to complain of a country, it still continues to 
suffer from the effects of WTO principles’ infringement (as it claimed) during the 
dispute settlement process. Even, if the country won the dispute, it does not get any 
“compensation” for the damage of that infringement and it does not receive refund 
for its legal expenses related to the dispute settlement process (WTO, 2004, p. 117). 
In addition, developing countries are lack of specialists for the dispute settlement 
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which make more difficult for them to defend their interests at DSB. Moreover, all 
developing countries in WTO are not successful to withdraw its obligations against 
another country of the dispute (respondent country) in case of “non-implementation” 
of WTO commitments even after ending of the dispute (WTO, 2004, p. 117). 
Consequently, all these have affected the statistics of disputes in terms of its 
distribution among member states regard to their economic development level as 
both complainant and respondent country.   
Although 447 cases have been brought to DSB within the time period 1995-2010, the 
EU and USA have taken half of disputes as both complainant and respondent country 
while least developed countries have almost no participation (only one complainant 
case), approximately only 1/5 of total cases belong to other developing countries 
excluding Brazil India and China (Horn and Johannesson, and Mavroidis, 2011, p. 
8). Thus, only these three countries hold nearly 1/10 (51 complainant and 55 
respondent) of total cases (Horn and Johannesson, and Mavroidis, 2011, p. 8). 
However, unproportional distribution of cases is explained by the volume and 
richness of products in foreign trade rather than the amount of countries. 
Anyway, the WTO Dispute Settlement System may not be considered as successful 
for the developing and least developed countries in terms of its weaknesses, which 
we mentioned above. However, it should be noted that it is better than the system of 
GATT 1947 and subject of the Doha Round of negotiations today.   
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2.7 Azerbaijan’s Case of the Accession to WTO 
2.7.1 Historical Outlook of the Accession 
The Republic of Azerbaijan had been a part of Soviet Union until 1991 with planned 
economic system. In 1991, Azerbaijan regained its independence and decided to 
change its economic system from planned to market economy. However, the 
transition process lasted so long which we will discuss later with details, one branch 
of this process was joining to international organizations.  
Although, joining to the WTO was suggested to Azerbaijan by the World Bank 
representatives in 1996, starting point of the WTO “story” of Azerbaijan is 
considered as March 1997 or the meeting of Heydar Aliyev as the president of 
Azerbaijan Republic with USA’s president Clinton, (Kavass, 2008, p. 343). Thus, at 
a press conference after the meeting, H. Aliyev declared that Azerbaijan will appeal 
for membership to the WTO. Consequently, Azerbaijan government prepared the 
required documents for the membership by his order and Azerbaijan sent an official 
application to the WTO on 23
rd
 June 1997 and WTO General Council adopted its 
application on 16
th
 July 1997 which gave it an observer status in the WTO as well as 
created a Working Party on the accession of Azerbaijan (Kavass, 2008, pp. 346-347). 
However, Azerbaijan’s economic conditions in time of the application were 
interesting in context of the desire for WTO membership. As we will see while 
discussing economic transition of Azerbaijan, production potential of the country 
was seriously destructed by the economic crises of 1991-1994. Moreover, its foreign 
trade was mainly based on “special agreements” (9/10 of foreign trade) (Kavass, 
2008, p. 344) in the context of the “Contract of the Century” signed between 
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Azerbaijan government and world oil companies. Thus, country’s import was mainly 
consisted of investment goods for oil and gas production under that contract. On the 
other hand, most part of its export was also oil and oil products. In this sense, the 
reasons behind the application for the membership are seemed out of economic based 
in the perspective of Azerbaijan Republic.  
Anyway, Azerbaijan expressed its interest to improve the accession process. 
However, the country was lack of experience or knowledge to respond the 
requirements of WTO accession in terms of submitting requested documents 
(memorandum on its foreign trade regime, etc.) and replying asked questions by 
members of the Working Party (Kavass, 2008). As a result, the first meeting of 
Working Party was delayed until 2002. In this sense, European Union, the USA and 
the World Bank had played an active role in terms of the assistance for the 
government of Azerbaijan to prepare the required documents as well as training 
authorized personals for the accession.  
Although the first meeting of the Working Party was held in June 2002, there was a 
not significant improvement in the accession process at least in terms of submitting 
required documents and replying the questions of the Working Party members 
(Kavass, 2008, p. 355). However, Azerbaijan government with the support of USA 
accelerated preparation and submitting of required documents to the WTO on time. 
As a result, the second and third meetings of Working Party were held on October 
12-15, 2004 and on June 27-July 1, 2005 respectively. At these meetings, submitted 
documents of Azerbaijan were discussed as well as Working Party members were 
informed about general economic environment of the country. In addition, the third 
Working Party meeting was accompanied by the multilateral negotiations on 
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agriculture with participation of USA, Australia, Canada, Malaysia and bilateral 
negotiations with USA, EU and Canada on services and tariffs.  
The accession process of Azerbaijan was continued with fourth (March 30, 2006) 
and fifth (May 6, 2008) meetings of Working Party which multilateral negotiations 
on agriculture and bilateral negotiations with USA, EU, Turkey, Taiwan, Canada, 
Japan were held under the framework of this meetings. Moreover, the government of 
Azerbaijan submitted required documents for the accession at the fifth meeting and 
as a result, preparing the “Factual Summary on Azerbaijan” was decided. At the sixth 
meeting, Azerbaijan side informed participants about the importance of non-oil 
sector’s development as well as diversification issue in Azerbaijan economy which 
declared its desire to become a member of WTO as “Landlocked Developing 
Country”.  
Although the USA and EU expressed that Azerbaijan should be acceded with 
“developed country status” at the seventh meeting (July 24, 2009), Azerbaijan 
stressed its economic concerns such as diversification issue and insisted on becoming 
a member of WTO with developing country status. Moreover, USA and EU 
suggested Azerbaijan to cease the government support as subsidies to the agriculture 
sector but, Azerbaijan representatives stressed the significance of this sector once 
more at the meeting. At the next meeting (October18, 2010), Azerbaijan submitted 
its revised offers for goods and services based on its economic interests as well as a 
justification for its purpose to become a member of WTO with developing country 
status.  
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In context of ninth meeting of the Working Party (February 24, 2012), bilateral 
negotiations were held with USA, EU, Norway, Japan and Canada on goods and 
services as well as with Ecuador only on goods and it is requested to decrease bound 
level of tariffs, join sectoral initiatives completely and increase market access 
liberalization in service sector of Azerbaijan. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s offers about 
the government support to agriculture were discussed at multilateral negotiations on 
agriculture and members of the Working Party, especially Canada and 
Commonwealth of Australia disagreed with Azerbaijan’s target to obtain 10% de 
minimus right for internal support to the agriculture.  
However, at the next meeting (December 7, 2012), Azerbaijan reemphasized its 
position to obtain 10% de minimus right as well as direct support in amount of $2 
billion to the its agriculture sector for every year. Although this was considered as 
impossible in previous negotiations, USA, EU, Canada, Commonwealth of Australia 
and Brazil emphasized its possibility for a certain time period after the accession. At 
the same time, bilateral and multilateral negotiations were held with some member 
countries over different issues in this meeting as well.  
In time of my writing this thesis, this is the last meeting of Working Group on 
Azerbaijan. However, new meetings are also expected to be held because, Azerbaijan 
still is not a member of the WTO. It is at the stage of multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations of an accession process. Despite of remaining many issues, Azerbaijan’s 
accession path to WTO indicates that there is a trend toward achieving the final 
agreement in terms of concessions during the process. In this sense, current situation 
in the accession process will be discussed in the following part. 
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2.7.2 Current Situation on the Accession Process 
Multilateral and bilateral negotiations are the most important and time-required 
stages in an accession process to the WTO. Thus, members of the organization join 
to the Working Party in order to pursue their own economic interests. In this sense, 
Paul Krugman stresses three basic “rules” of about the purpose of WTO members 
who join the negotiations: “exports are good”, “imports are bad”, “other things equal, 
an equal increase in imports and exports is good” (Bagwell and Staiger, 1999, pp. 
225-226). Therefore, the countries in negotiations try to obtain the best conditions for 
their export in terms of the level of tariffs and government support of an acceding 
country to its domestic economy.  
Azerbaijan’s accession process also included the stage of multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations. After the third meeting of the Working Party on Azerbaijan, the 
negotiations were held on agriculture, services, tariffs, etc. However, the 
representatives from Azerbaijan stressed the concerns of Azerbaijan government 
about the development of non-oil sector and diversification of its economy at the 
sixth meeting of Working Party which strengthened Azerbaijan’s hand in 
negotiations.  
According to the official site for Azerbaijan’s accession to WTO (www.wto.az), 
there are 37 participant countries in the Working Party. These are USA, European 
Union (EU), China, Canada, Argentina, Australia, Turkey, Brazil, Pakistan, Croatia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Haiti, Honduras, Norway, India, 
Japan, Jordan, Korea Republic, Ukraine, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Moldova, 
Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, 
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Switzerland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Viet Nam which EU participate as a 
custom union and represents the interests of its all members (27 countries).  
Although the accession process has already lasted more than 16 years, a significant 
success is not achieved at the bilateral and multilateral negotiations between 
Azerbaijan and Working Party members. Thus, bilateral negotiations were only 
ended with Oman, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Georgia and Kyrgyz 
Republic (bilateral protocols were signed) as well as China (CESD, 2013). However, 
bilateral negotiations still continue with remaining Working Party members, 
especially with USA, the EU, Canada and Australia as the main countries in world 
trade (CESD, 2013). Moreover, these countries are the most influential ones on the 
accession of a state to the organization. Although Russia joined to the WTO in 
August 2012, it has not yet joined to the Working Party on Azerbaijan’s accession. 
However, Russia’s joining to the working party is expected in the near future which 
has borders with Azerbaijan.  
Obviously, Azerbaijan wants to get the membership status in WTO with favorable 
conditions as much as possible which clashes with the interests of other member 
states. Thus, Azerbaijan’s initial offer for tariff negotiations is 14.4% on average and 
it aims to protect some crucial sectors of its economy through increasing tariffs on 
the import of relevant goods. On the other hand, it purposes to decrease the level of 
tariffs over the import of other goods in order to maintain the existing average tariff 
level. Tariff negotiations are separated into three categories such as agricultural 
products, non-agricultural products and sectoral initiatives.  
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In this context, Azerbaijan offers 22.88% bound tariffs for agricultural products in 
average with 0% minimum and 80% maximum. However, Azerbaijan’s offered 
average level of bound tariffs for agricultural products is higher than the level of 
corresponding tariffs of its neighbors such as Georgia (12.4%) and Armenia (14.7%) 
which are the members of WTO. Moreover, Azerbaijan offers higher bound tariffs 
(30-50%) on import of many goods which are considered as crucial for its economy.  
On the other hand, Azerbaijan’s initial offer for bound tariff levels on non-
agricultural products is 10.4% in average or more precisely, changes between 0% as 
the minimum and 50% as the maximum. Zero tariff level is defined for the import of 
raw materials or inputs for the domestic production. Average level of bound tariffs 
for non-agricultural products is also higher than Georgia (10.2%) and Armenia 
(7.7%). Here, it must be noted that the indicated tariff levels for both Georgia and 
Armenia are the levels of when they acceded to WTO. Thus, level of bound tariffs 
for both agricultural and non-agricultural products generally falls after the end of a 
defined time period.  
In addition, tariff negotiations also include discussions on ensuring sectoral 
initiatives which purposes totally abolishing of tariffs or harmonizing of tariff levels 
in certain industry fields (ITA, 2013). Obviously, participation in sectoral initiatives 
is also an important issue on Azerbaijan’s accession to the WTO. Thus, members of 
WTO, particularly USA and EU insists on joining of Azerbaijan to sectoral 
initiatives in some sectors at the high level such as information technologies, 
chemical harmonization, different kinds of equipment (construction, agricultural, 
medical, scientific) and etc. whereas Azerbaijan agrees to fully participate in the 
initiative only on agricultural equipment and partially on construction equipment 
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(94%), pharmaceutical preparations (93%), scientific equipment (87%), medical 
equipment (78%), chemical harmonization (70%), civil aviation (45%) and 
information technologies (35%).  
On the other hand, WTO members, especially USA and EU demand from Azerbaijan 
to take commitment not to impose subsidies on the service sector, ensure the 
obtaining property rights over land for foreigners within Azerbaijan, increase the 
liberalization related to working of foreign specialists in Azerbaijan, provide 
nondiscriminatory conditions for foreign service suppliers, remove all king of 
restrictions over services as requirements of GATS etc. Negotiations on Azerbaijan’s 
accession include also discussion on the technical barriers over trade in terms of 
mainly standardization and certification as well as harmonization of the legal basis 
for protection of intellectual property rights with the requirements of WTO.       
To summarize the current situation in the accession process of Azerbaijan to the 
WTO, there is not a considerable progress during past sixteen years that bilateral 
negotiations are ended with only a few members of the Working Party. Moreover, 
some other countries such as Russia are expected to join to the Working Party on 
Azerbaijan which will require the start of bilateral negotiations with one more 
country. On the other hand, it seems that both Azerbaijan and WTO members insist 
on their own interests which make the accession more difficult. Therefore, there is 
less possibility for Azerbaijan to obtain WTO membership in near future.  
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2.7.3 Reasons behind Delaying of the Accession Process 
Despite of long-lasting accession process (more than sixteen years), Azerbaijan has 
not achieved to the membership status at the WTO. In addition, the accession process 
itself can not be considered as successful enough in light of this long time period. 
Several reasons may be specified as the cause delaying the membership. These can 
be both politically and economically rooted.  
Sometimes, a country applies for the membership to WTO and this is followed by 
establishing a working party but, it does not implement the other required actions 
such as preparing and submitting the Memorandum or did this after a long time 
period which is known as “weak follow-up” as a usual case for the accession of 
countries in transition (Michalopoulos, 2000, p. 74). In this sense, although 
Azerbaijan applied for the membership to WTO in June 1997, it submitted the 
Memorandum on its Foreign Trade Regime in April 1999. Moreover, as we 
mentioned above there were serious problems related to the preparing required 
documents and answering the questions asked by the working party members on 
Azerbaijan in first years of the accession process. Thus, Azerbaijan ended 
submission of required documents to the WTO secretariat only in mid-2004 with the 
foreign assistance (Kavass, 2008, p. 360). Therefore, the main reason of delaying the 
accession process until 2004 should be considered as that Azerbaijan government 
was inexperienced in this kind of issues.  
On the other hand, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is 
also considered as having an “indirect impact” on the accession process in terms of 
decreasing the scope of technical assistance from the members of WTO, creating 
sensitive questions as asked in the accession of Armenia and considering as a 
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potential impediment for the congressional support for development (ESCAP, 2001, 
p. 112). Especially the last one is based on Jackson-Vanik amendment (section 907) 
which limits the support of USA to Azerbaijan (ESCAP, 2001, p. 112). In addition, 
sometimes, Armenia (a member of WTO) is considered as an obstacle for 
Azerbaijan’s accession to WTO. However, Mahmoud Mammadguliyev who is 
Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator on the accession process of 
Azerbaijan has stated that “Armenia has sent a letter stating that it would not oppose 
the entry of Azerbaijan in this organization” in time of its accession to WTO 
(Akhundov, 2012). 
As we mentioned above, participants of multilateral and bilateral negotiations always 
pursue their own economic interests. In this sense, both Azerbaijan and other 
negotiator countries try to achieve the best outcome for themselves. That is why 
multilateral and bilateral negotiations require long time in order to get a conclusion. 
When we look through the meetings of the working party on Azerbaijan’s accession, 
we find out that there are several major disputable economic issues such as the bound 
level of tariffs, government support to the agriculture, status of the membership, 
participation in sectoral initiatives, etc.  
Azerbaijan insists to achieve the membership to WTO with developing country status 
which would ensure some concessions such as longer time period to implement all 
WTO commitments, special treatment while adopting rules in some fields like 
antidumping and technical barriers over trade, 10% de minimis opportunity to 
subsidize the agriculture sector, allowance to restrict the trade in order to solve 
balance of payments concerns and safeguard the external financial position (GATT, 
38 
 
Article XII) and etc. Especially, agriculture is the main problematic field in 
negotiations.  
 More precisely, Azerbaijan intends to preserve government control over trade with 
other countries even after its accession to WTO. In addition, it insists on obtaining 
the highest de minimis level which would enable it to protect its agriculture sector 
from possible negative impacts of the accession. However, this represents the 
interests of Azerbaijan rather than all sides in negotiations that some countries, 
especially USA and EU insist on membership of Azerbaijan to WTO with developed 
country status as well as giving 5% de minimis level due to subsidize its own 
agriculture sector. In this sense, the success of negotiations is strongly related to the 
compromise of all sides which leads to the delaying of this accession process.  
Another main issue in accession negotiations is related to the harmonization of 
Azerbaijan’s legislation with WTO standards. Thus, M. Mammadguliyev had stated 
that “the second issue is of course the improvement of legislation to meet WTO 
standards. There are 40-50 documents, 30 of which have been approved in 
accordance with the organization’s requirements” (CESD, 2012a). Moreover, some 
experts consider the monopoly and fear of integration in Azerbaijan economy and 
government as the main reasons behind delaying of this accession process but, these 
are only suppositions which have not any significant prove.  
However, the impact of oil factor over the accession process is clearly 
understandable. As we mentioned above, Azerbaijan has stressed the oil dependence 
of its economy and especially export as well as diversification and development of 
non-oil economy issues. In addition, oil revenues gave opportunity to the government 
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of Azerbaijan to finance 10% de minimis level in case of its obtaining in 
negotiations. Nevertheless, Azerbaijani economist V. Bayramov considers that “as 
long as the oil price remains high there is no incentive” for Azerbaijan’s WTO 
membership (CESD, 2012b).  
On the other hand, Turkish economist C. Bulut (2007) considers that increase of 
liberalization after each round of WTO negotiations makes the conditions more 
difficult for an applicant country that consequently, delaying of the accession process 
may increase possible difficulties (pp. 66-67). In addition, the accession of post-
Soviet countries to the WTO will also increase difficulties in Azerbaijan’s accession 
process that obviously, those countries will also demand bilateral negotiations with 
Azerbaijan.  
To sum up, various reasons may be specified as the cause of delaying the accession 
process of Azerbaijan to WTO. However, we discussed comparatively more 
important ones such as weak follow-up, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, disagreement 
on membership status and the level of agricultural support, conformity of legislation 
with WTO standards, oil factor and time issue. In context of these reasons, it is 
expected that Azerbaijan’s accession process will take some more years from the 
future.   
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Chapter 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
WTO has been at the center of many scholars’ interests. Thus, there are both 
proponents and opponents of WTO. In this sense, my research is focused on the 
impact of WTO on economic growth of developing countries. However, WTO is 
mostly about the trade and has an indirect impact over GDP which does this through 
affecting export and import of developing countries. The first main question is does 
the GATT/WTO matter for international trade?  And the second one, if it matters 
what is the relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth in 
developing countries?    
3.1 Critiques toward GATT/WTO 
For the first time after creation of WTO, American economist Andrew K. Rose 
(2004a) did a systematic research about the impacts of GATT/WTO over the 
international trade. More precisely, he evaluated the impacts of multilateral trade 
agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) ensured for developing 
states by developed countries. In this research, he used “gravity model” of bilateral 
trade and employed the data of 50 years from 175 countries within a panel dataset.  
This research was focused on the effects of multilateral trade agreements while 
controlling standard factors as much as possible which affect the international trade 
such as culture, population, distance, language, location, area, colonial history and 
GSP status of countries. Moreover, he used natural logarithm of trade as the 
dependent variable.  
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After taking into consideration of all these factors, he found out that increasing of 
trade is not related with GATT/WTO. If it would be the case, changes in trade of 
member countries should be “significantly different” from nonmember countries. As 
a result, he concludes that there is not “strong empirical evidence” yet to say 
“GATT/WTO has systematically played a strong role in encouraging trade”. 
Nevertheless, his finding on the effects of GSP on trade had been significantly 
positive which increased the trade twice. In addition, Rose found out statistically and 
economically significant difference in the impacts of GATT/WTO in terms of rounds 
of negotiations. According to his findings, only initial one or two rounds of 
negotiations have had economically large impacts on international trade.  
In another research, Rose (2004b) tested the hypotheses that whether GATT/WTO 
has increased stability and predictability in international trade or not. Again, he used 
the same dataset. At the same time, he employed the “conventional gravity model” of 
mutual trade among countries and the version of this model which he used to control 
many standard factors as well. This time, he defined the “coefficient of variation for 
the natural logarithm of real bilateral exports” as the dependent variable. As a result, 
he concluded that a state does not “experience more stable trade” after its accession 
to GATT/WTO in comparison with pre-accession period. However, it is not possible 
to test whether GATT/WTO stabilized international trade or not because of the data 
unavailability of before the creation of the GATT. Therefore, the hypothesis of this 
research “can not be rejected” but, the author also fails to find strong evidence in 
order to say that membership to GATT/WTO makes trade flows more predictable.  
In his another article, Rose (2004c) studied the effect of GATT/WTO membership on 
trade policy liberalization. This time, he tries to find the answer of whether 
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GATT/WTO membership is related with higher level of liberal trade policy or not. 
For this, he utilizes 68 different “measures of trade policy and liberalization”. After 
all, he concluded that there is not significant correlation between trade policy 
measures and membership to the GATT/WTO. Thus, no reliable evidence was found 
to defend that GATT/WTO membership is related with more liberal trade policy. In 
this sense, his findings embodies that members and nonmembers of GATT/WTO do 
not substantially differ at tariff rates, non-tariff  barriers, “price-based measures”, 
“measures of openness” and etc.  
On the other hand, J. Gowa and S. Y. Kim (2005) have studied the impacts of the 
GATT over international trade during 1950-1994. In their research, they find out that 
the impacts of GATT over trade had been “large”, “positive” and “significant” for 
only the trade of USA, Britain, France, Canada and Germany. This implies that 
GATT had leaded to the increase only of a few states’ trade. According to the 
authors, GATT changed the trade system of war period “de jure but not de facto” that 
trade patterns of postwar period have been affected by some interwar blocs as well. 
In this sense, the authors consider GATT as an attempt to increase the welfare of 
main countries in international trade instead of solving market-failure issues. 
Walter G. Park (2009) has studied the impacts of WTO over distribution of trade, 
FDIs and patenting in developing and least developed countries in regard to their 
membership to WTO. He has classified developing and least developed countries in 
two groups - members and nonmembers of the WTO and make a comparison 
between these two groups. By using rank-sum tests, he found out that distribution of 
trade between developing country members and nonmembers of WTO had been 
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“insignificantly different” (statistically) within 1996-1999 and significantly different 
within 2000-2003.  
For least developed countries, the difference in distribution of trade between 
members and nonmember is always statistically insignificant within both time 
periods. On the other hand, the inflow and outflow of FDIs are found as 
“insignificantly different” among members and nonmembers of either developing or 
least developed countries. Moreover, the distribution of both resident and non-
resident patent filings is also insignificantly different between members and 
nonmembers of both developing and least developed countries.  
T. S. Eicher and C. Henn (2011) have also studied the impacts of WTO over 
international trade within a general approach through minimizing omitted variable 
biasedness. Thus, the authors stress the issue of omitted variable biasedness as the 
main cause of different results about the impact of WTO over international trade in 
previous researches. In this sense, they find out that WTO has not done a statistically 
significant impact on international trade transactions. In contrast with WTO, 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) impact trade strongly but unevenly.  
Nevertheless, in case of addressing to special fields of trade which WTO may 
impact, it is concluded that membership to WTO increases trade until the creation of 
PTA among countries in less distance at the expense of international trade with other 
countries in long distance. Moreover, the impact of WTO is also depend on “terms-
of-trade” in time of the accession. Thus, countries which are more encouraged to 
negotiate decreasing of tariffs before the accession face with positive and significant 
impacts of WTO over its international trade after the accession.  
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J. Roy (2011) has also conducted a research in order to study the impacts of WTO 
over international trade. Despite of previous research focused on solving Rose’s 
“interesting mystery”, the author claims that those researches fail to simultaneously 
address to the zero-trade problem trade “while controlling for the multilateral 
resistance terms”. He employs the gravity with and without bilateral fixed effects 
which is regressed against log of real imports and bilateral trade data from 1950 to 
2000. However, his findings do not support the claims about the significant role of 
WTO in trade promoting. Consequently, Roy states that “formal membership in the 
WTO is never found to increase bilateral trade”.  
In addition, J. Swinnen, A. Olper and T. Vandemoortele (2012) have conducted a 
research about the impact of WTO agreements over agricultural and food policies of 
members. As a result, they have found out a “significant shift from distortionary to 
less distortionary instruments” rather than a substantial fall in agricultural support in 
case of acceding to the organization.   
3.2 Supporters of the GATT/WTO System 
Rose’s findings have been criticized by many scholars such as A. Subramanian, S-J. 
Wei, M. Tomz, J. L. Goldstein, D. Rivers and etc. Thus, Subramanian and Wei 
(2007) (hereafter SW) used a bilateral gravity trade model and the same data which 
Rose also used in his researches. Nevertheless, they added importer and exporter 
effects into their model and claimed that these would substantially alter the outcome 
of research which Rose’s model does not include.  Moreover, SW made one more 
significant change to the model used by Rose. Thus, they used a model regressed on 
imports instead of average real trade. As an outcome of this research, they found out 
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that GATT/WTO has played a significant role in increasing of international trade but, 
this role has been “uneven” as a result of “asymmetries” within the system.  
Thus, the effect of GATT/WTO membership has been higher in sectors where the 
impediments over trade are decreased in comparison with protected sectors. In 
addition, the new members of WTO (developing countries) have liberalized their 
trade much more than the old members as a result of negotiations with more 
countries during the accession process in comparison with old ones. Moreover, SW 
concludes that membership to GATT/WTO has increased the trade of developed 
countries primarily and strongly. According to SW, this does not mean that 
“developing countries have not benefited from WTO membership”. Empirical results 
indicate that imports of developing countries have been less affected by the 
membership to WTO. Nevertheless, developing countries have benefited from the 
trade liberalization in developed countries which their export to those countries has 
increased substantially with the impact of GATT/WTO. 
However, M. Tomz, J. L. Goldstein and D. Rivers (2007a) (hereafter TGR) criticized 
both Rose and SW in terms of their classification of countries as members and 
nonmembers of GATT/WTO. Because Rose and SW use the same dataset in their 
research, TGR claim that they fail in defining of all participants of GATT/WTO. 
According to TGR, GATT established rights and commitments also for “colonies, 
newly independent states, and provisional members” as nonmember participants. 
Thus, considering them out of the system as done by Rose and SW understates 
GATT’s impacts over trade. In this sense, they consider nonmember participants as 
part of the system in their model.  In another article, they do an empirical research 
about this issue through using bilateral trade data after 1946 (Goldstein and Rivers, 
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and Tomz, 2007b). After all, TGR find out the impact of GATT/WTO on 
international trade as positive and statistically and economically significant. They 
claim that all members of this system (developing countries as well) have benefited 
from the GATT/WTO.  
C. Balding (2010) has also studied the impacts of WTO over the international trade. 
He uses the same data like Rose and SW but, define the imports as the dependent 
variable of his model in order to find out the effects of WTO membership on 
exporter and importer countries. Balding stresses that WTO affects “imports and 
exports differently” which is the cause of insignificant results in case of regressing 
against overall trade. According to the findings, increasing of both exports and 
imports are observed in only high-income countries whereas other countries face 
with “stagnant” or decreasing levels of trade. Moreover, trade substantially increases 
among member countries of WTO but, it decreases if one of the sides in international 
trade is a nonmember country.  
General conclusion from Balding’s research is that WTO membership affects trade 
“positively”. Nevertheless, trade level of lesser develop countries doesnot rise with 
the effect of WTO membership. According to Balding’, “joining to WTO is all about 
exports” that countries join to the organization in order to sell to the rest of the world 
rather than purchase from other countries. In this sense, the effect of WTO 
membership over exports is higher in comparison with its impacts over imports. 
Moreover, member countries export much more to nonmembers than their import 
from those countries. Therefore, WTO membership increases the exports to both 
members and nonmembers of the organization.  
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X. Liu (2009) criticized the researches associated with the “ineffectiveness” of 
GATT/WTO in terms of increasing international trade. Thus, he claims that 
GATT/WTO also causes to changing the extensive margins of international trade 
through establishing new trade relations beyond affecting intensive margins of trade 
(existing trade relationships). Some of previous studies do not take into consideration 
the impacts of GATT/WTO on extensive margins of trade and this leads to the 
underestimation of GATT/WTO impacts. Moreover, he stresses the incapability of 
the traditional log-linear gravity model to work with heteroskedasticity issue and 
“non-normal residual” which causes to misestimating the impacts of GATT/WTO 
over intensive margins of trade as well. After all, the research ensures strong 
evidence about the effectiveness of GATT/WTO in promoting trade at both extensive 
margins of trade throughout the first five rounds of negotiations under GATT and 
intensive margins of trade especially after the creation of WTO.  However, P. Dutt, 
T. V. Zandt and I. Mihov (2013) have found positive impact of WTO membership 
over extensive margin but, negative impact on intensive margin of trade.  
Rose’s finding about the effectiveness of GATT/WTO was criticized by L. Konya, L. 
Matyas and M. Harris (2011) as well.  In their research, they use a new international 
dataset which enables to modeling the imports and exports respectively in order to 
analyze the extensive margin of trade. With the application of this dataset, they get 
positive results for the impacts of GATT/WTO over the international trade. 
Therefore, membership in GATT/WTO promotes international trade between 
member countries as well as member-nonmember countries. As the cause of Rose’s 
negative results for the effectiveness of GATT/WTO, they stress not including the 
“zero bilateral trade observations” into his dataset.  
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On the other hand, M. H. Kim (2008) criticizes Rose’s finding in a different way. He 
argues that when the impact of this GATT/WTO was assessed, the researches should 
only focus on the trade in goods and sectors which are under the sphere of influence 
of this system. In this sense, he takes out the trade in agriculture, textile and oil from 
the evaluation within his research because of which those fields of trade are not 
regulated by GATT/WTO rules. Despite the exclusion of agriculture and textile (not 
oil) from the trade, the impacts of GATT/WTO over increasing of international trade 
become still insignificant. However, the impacts of GATT/WTO on trade become 
insignificantly positive in case of exclusion the oil trade from the evaluation as well. 
After all, he concludes that GATT/WTO has had significantly positive impact over 
the international trade in sectors which are under its sphere of the influence.  
However, J. H. Grant and K.A. Boys (2012) study the exclusion of trade in 
agriculture through a large panel data on agricultural and nonagricultural 
international trade flows between countries from 1980 to 2004. The outcome of this 
research is that GATT/WTO promotes agricultural trade of member countries 
significantly (161% on average) which is approximately twice of the GATT/WTO 
impact on nonagricultural trade of members. In this sense, middle and low income 
countries, who are interested in increasing agricultural exports, significantly benefit 
from the GATT/WTO membership. Moreover, including zero trade flows into the 
model enable to claim that membership in GATT/WTO does not just promote the 
existing trade relations or intensive margin of trade, it also causes to the 
establishment of new trade partnerships or promoting extensive margin of trade.  
B. Herzl and M. Warner (2011) attempts to produce a “generalized approach” about 
the trade impacts of GATT/WTO through taking into consideration the findings of 
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previous researches done by Rose, SW and TGR. Thus, they consider “de facto 
membership” as appropriate for many countries and influential for the effect of 
GATT/WTO membership. In order to cover the asymmetric impacts of mutual and 
non-mutual trade agreements, they define “unidirectional import flows” as the 
dependent variable in their research. Moreover, they also include zero trade flows 
into the evaluation which avoids neglecting extensive margin of international trade or 
biasedness of the estimation. As a result of “fixed-effect Poisson maximum-
likelihood (PML) estimation”, Herz1-Wagner find out that GATT/WTO promotes 
trade among members as well as with nonmembers. In this sense, they argue that the 
impact of GATT/WTO over the international trade of member countries is positive 
and statistically significant.  
P. Chang and M. Lee (2011) study the impacts of GATT/WTO membership over 
bilateral trade among countries through application of “nonparametric methods” such 
as “pair-matching”, “permutation tests” and “Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis”. As a 
result, they find out that GATT/WTO significantly increases trade between members 
of the organization which is greater than the impact over trade between member and 
nonmember countries. Their conclusion remains the same in case of using 
participation status rather than formal membership as an indicator in the model. As 
response to Rose’s negative findings about the impacts of GATT/WTO over 
international trade, they emphasize the misspecification issue in conventional gravity 
models especially in terms of homogeneous membership impacts assumption.  
Although agriculture is not still taken under the control of GATT/WTO system, K. 
Anderson (2010) has studied the impact of WTO on trade distortions in this sector. 
Thus, he stresses the failure of GATT/WTO in avoiding the increase of protectionism 
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in agriculture. In this sense, he emphasizes the importance of Doha round of 
negotiations that the agricultural protectionism may be increased much more in case 
of failing of this round. In case of removing protectionist policies over agriculture, 
the authors argue that the benefit of both farms and unskilled workers in agriculture 
sector would substantially, even seriously more than  the comparative gain of non-
agriculture sectors. Moreover, inequality and poverty would be reduced with these 
reforms.  
E. D. Mansfield and E. Reinhardt (2008) have studied the impact of international 
institutions, especially WTO over the “volatility” of world commerce. They consider 
that countries join to international institutions such as the WTO in order to protect 
their economies from volatilities of international trade. In this context, authors 
hypothesize that those institutions decrease instability of the international trade. They 
use yearly export data for all bilateral relationships during the period from 1951 to 
2001 for statistical tests and find out that WTO significantly decreases instability of 
exports which mean stabilizing of international trade.  
M. Jansen (2010) emphasizes the importance of WTO in ensuring international 
standards in the world trade which causes to the decreasing of transaction costs. In 
addition, international standards are the essential policy measures to represent the 
quality of products to customers, including product safety. So that, WTO agreements 
cover rules about application of the standards due to prevent trade restrictions by 
member countries through imposing some kinds of measures. In addition, those 
agreements stimulate member countries to harmonize their standards or reciprocally 
recognize standards of other countries. Consequently, WTO agreements ensure 
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opportunities for member countries to decrease transaction costs during the trade 
because of the differences in standards.  
T. Buthe and H. V. Milner (2008) have studied the connection between FDI flow and 
GATT/WTO membership. According to the authors, joining to the organization 
ensures mechanisms for oversee capital owners to make obligations about the 
policies of an acceding country related to foreign assets. As a result, this causes to 
the increasing of investments in member countries. In this sense, international trade 
agreements create opportunities for developing countries to pull much more FDI 
which provide higher economic growth as well. More precisely, WTO membership 
raises the inflow of FDIs. This impact is still significant and positive even in case of 
taking domestic policy measures into consideration in the model. S. H. Shah, H. 
Hasnat and J. li (2010) have also found significantly positive impact of WTO over 
trade and inward FDI through statistical analysis in case of South Asian countries.  
3.3 WTO/Trade Liberalization and Economic Growth  
GATT/WTO membership is considered as the cause of liberalization in international 
trade by many scholars. T. L. Allee and J. E. Scalera (2012) claim that the impact of 
WTO accession is associated with the level of trade liberalization or obligations of 
acceding countries during the accession process. More precisely, the countries with 
higher level of commitments (policy changes) in terms of trade liberalization benefit 
much more from the WTO membership in comparison with member countries which 
less rigorously acceded (lower policy changes) to the organization. This conclusion 
derives from their classification of member states in WTO in terms of accession form 
such as “rigorous”, “early” and “automatic” as well as doing an empirical research 
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based on details of each country’s accession process and commitments in time of 
accession.  
The countries which acceded to the WTO at the end of a rigorous accession process 
(higher trade liberalization obligations) obtain substantial gains from trade after their 
membership. Early acceded countries also achieve higher level of trade after their 
membership in case of decreasing tariffs, significantly. However, not any evidence is 
available to say that trade increases in automatic joiners who acceded to the WTO 
without taking commitments to liberalize their trade.  
In general, the relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth has 
been in interest of many scholars. Despite of huge amounts of studies, there are still 
some controversial points about the relationship. Some scholars have found the effect 
of international trade over economic growth as positive (Edwards, 1998; Frankel and 
Romer, 1996; Islam and Hye, and Shahbaz, 2012; Harrison, 1996; Winters, 2004). 
However, the definite relationship was not found yet because of some 
methodological and other kinds of reasons (He, 2011).  
J. Lee (1995) stresses the importance of capital goods’ for less developed countries 
which he considers to be helpful for the economic growth. More precisely, he claims 
that “relatively cheaper foreign capital goods, increases efficiency of capital 
accumulation” which fasters the economic growth in less developed countries. 
According to the author, any trade restrictions over capital goods’ import harms 
long-run economic growth in those countries.  
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According to K. Kiyota (2012), the impact of developing countries’ trade 
liberalization on equality in those countries is also uncertain. On the basis of a 
“multiple-cone neoclassical growth model”, Kiyota stresses that liberalization may 
increase “income inequality” and decrease “per capita GDP” if a country is globally 
labor abundant and locally capital abundant.  
Moreover, D. Kim (2011) has used the “instrumental variable threshold regressions 
approach” in order to study the impact of trade liberalization over standard of living 
and long-run economic growth. His findings express that “greater trade openness 
tends to have strongly beneficial effects on growth and the standard of living of 
developed countries”. However, international trade significantly negatively affects 
the “growth and real income” of less developed countries. According to Kim, trade 
affects economic performance of countries different channels such as “capital 
accumulation” and “productivity”.   
L. T. He (2011) has used “distributed lag models” in order to analyze short-term and 
long-term effects of international trade over GDP growth and inflation. The outcome 
of this analyze is that in case of huge accumulated trade deficit, trade significantly 
negatively impacts both economic growth and inflation which causes insignificantly 
negative impact over real GDP growth. In other words, if the current trade is not 
balanced, it negatively affects the GDP growth. That is why the author stresses the 
importance of a “strong trade policy” in order to encourage the GDP growth and 
avoid inflation in many cases. More precisely, international trade can increase 
economic productivity and decrease inflation.  
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D-H. Kim and S-C. Lin (2009) have studied the impact of international trade over 
economic growth of countries at different development levels. They have used the 
“instrument-variable threshold regressions approach” in this research and find out 
that trade affects economic growth through both capital accumulation and 
productivity channels. More precisely, it affects investments negatively in low-
income countries and positively in high income countries. According to the findings, 
less developed countries tend to specialize in production of traditional goods in case 
of increasing trade openness. At the same time, developed countries specialize in 
production of goods which require high level of research and development.   
In this sense, advanced economies benefits from trade in terms of its positive impact 
over investment and productivity while trade negatively affects both of them in less 
developed countries because of “technological or financial constraints” (Kim and 
Lin, 2009). The research done by S. Dowrick and J. Golley (2004) produces similar 
results about the distribution of trade benefits among countries.  According to the 
authors, developed countries have got most part of trade benefit after 1980 and very 
small share has gone to less developed countries.  
Moreover, the research done by A. Santos-Paulino and A. P. Thirlwall (2004) is also 
interesting in this context. They have studied the impact of trade liberalization over 
export, import as well as trade and current account balance of the balance of 
payments through including 22 developing countries from different regions of the 
world where substantial trade liberalization was observed after 1970s. They find out 
that exports and imports of developing countries are significantly affected by trade 
liberalization in terms of decreasing export and import duties. As a result, imports 
have increased much more than exports. According to the authors, trade 
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liberalization has caused to the worsening of trade and current account balance of the 
balance of payments in developing countries.  
In addition, negative impact of trade liberalization on export and positive impact on 
import is more in developing countries with higher level of protection before 
liberalizing the trade. In this sense, authors state that countries’ balance of payments 
may be affected severely if import increase much more than exports with the impact 
of trade liberalization which can limit the economic growth of those countries as 
well. In his another research, A. Santos-Paulino (2005) stresses one more the issue of 
balance of trade and balance of payments in case of higher import growth after trade 
liberalization in developing countries.  
Trade balance of a country represents if it is a “borrower” or “lender” in global 
capital markets (Gould and Ruffin, 1996). Thus, countries became a borrower in case 
of continuous trade deficits and vice versa. Gould and Ruffin (1996) also emphasizes 
the significance of international trade for the GDP growth through explaining basic 
form of GDP calculation (expenditure method):  
GDP = C + I + G + X – M 
Here, C-consumption, I-investment and G-government expenditures, X-export and 
M-import. Clearly, an increase in exports positively affects the GDP while import 
increase causes to the decreasing of it or has negative impact over GDP of a country. 
However, the gap/surplus of (X-M) is filled by the capital inflow/outflow. 
Consequently, the authors find “little” impact of “trade imbalances” over the GDP 
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growth rates when basic determinants of the GDP growth are accounted for (Gould 
and Ruffin 1996).   
Pacheco-López and Thirlwall (2007) have done a case study of Latin American 
countries (17 countries) in order to find out the impact of trade liberalization over the 
GDP growth. According to the authors, most of those countries have grown “faster, 
but at the expense of a deteriorating trade balance”. Moreover, Chang, Kaltani and 
Loayza (2009) stress the importance of “complementary reforms” after trade 
liberalization in terms of gaining advantage in international competition. In an 
empirical research, they have found out that the impact of trade liberalization over 
economic growth can be “significantly improved” in case of undertaking a set of 
complementary reforms.  
3.4 Previous Researches on Azerbaijan’s Case 
Although Azerbaijan’s WTO accession has been continued since 1997, only a few 
researches have been done associated with its possible impacts over the economy of 
this country. Moreover, most of those researches do not include empirical 
estimations and econometrically assessed forecasting. More precisely, some scholars 
have only stressed possible positive and negative impacts of WTO accession just in 
“words” or theoretically based rather than producing an outcome through applying 
econometric models.     
Thus, V. Bayramov (2008) has studied the impacts of WTO accession over 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which Azerbaijan is a member of CIS as 
well. As a result of comparative analysis of CIS country economies in terms, he has 
concluded that Azerbaijan’s WTO accession will have positive impacts over struggle 
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against corruption, reducing monopoly, increasing transparency and deepening 
economic integration. Nevertheless, accession to WTO is expected to negatively 
impact the “small producers, agriculture farmers and service sector”.    
3.5 Limitations of Existing Research 
Most of the studies on the impact of WTO over economies of the member countries 
focus on the international trade impact as measured in total amount. More precisely, 
they do not usually look at export and import change separately in terms of studying 
the measurable impact of WTO membership on economic growth. In fact, I did not 
find any research which attempt to find out if the membership at WTO significantly 
affects the economic growth performance of member countries. In addition, many 
scholars do not take into consideration the impact of the time of membership which 
is an important point. Moreover, none of the researchers attempt to study the 
expected impacts of the membership for a nonmember country.  
This thesis aims to resolve the last issue in case of Azerbaijan. Thus, the thesis will 
represent how macroeconomic indicators such as economic growth rate, export, 
import, net FDI flow, external debt/GDP ratio and gross capital formation in 
Azerbaijan economy are expected to changeif the country become a member of the 
WTO. The model will be based on Georgia and Armenia’s macroeconomic 
performance before and after the WTO membership. In this sense, this thesis will 
also ensure empirical results for Georgia and Armenia, individually which will 
enable to discuss the effectiveness of WTO membership for these two country.  
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Chapter 4 
GENERAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK OF AZERBAIJAN, 
GEORGIA AND ARMENIA 
4.1 Azerbaijan Economy in Transition Period: Historical and 
Graphical Interpretation 
The first years of independence had been much difficult for the Republic of 
Azerbaijan from both politic and economic sides. More precisely, economic 
problems were mainly the result of political changes in the country. Thus, the years 
1991-1994 are named as the first period, recession period or regress period in 
economic development of Azerbaijan by different researchers. Unfortunately, this 
period of Azerbaijan economy has not been studied separately through identifying all 
causes of the economic decline. Here, we will discuss both political-economic and 
economic challenges for Azerbaijan within this period of its transition to market 
economy.  
4.1.1 Recession Period: 1991-1994 
Prior to independence, Azerbaijan was a part of the Soviet Union until 1991. During 
this period, economic system of the country was centrally planned (CPE). After 
regaining its independence, Azerbaijan targeted to transform its economic system 
toward market economy which required privatization and liberalization in all fields 
of the economy. However, Azerbaijan faced with serious political and economic 
recession during the initial years of the independence.  
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In time of Soviet Union (SU), country’s economic system was designed for the 
strategic requirements of the SU (Soyak and Nesirova, 2003, p. 3). Cultivation of 
lands was done collectively within massive production cooperatives and state farms 
which everything was under the control of administration (Lermana, 2000, p. 96). 
Despite of the independence, CPE still preserved its power in economy within the 
first period. Privatization could not be started because of political instability and 
ongoing war with Armenia. Moreover, the president of Azerbaijan was changed three 
times during the first three years of independence. The Communist party was in the 
administration yet and the first president of Azerbaijan (Ayaz Mutalibov) was 
“dependent” from the central government. He was unresponsive for the national 
problems and following Russia oriented policies (Yunusov, 2001, p. 62).  
However, under the leadership of Abulfaz Elchibey or the Azerbaijan Popular Front 
Party (APF) after May 1992, the country’s policy changed toward “nationalistic” 
Turkish oriented foreign policy which worsened conditions of the country in terms of 
economic pressure, done by Russia and Iran (Ismailzade, 2005, p. 2). In brief, the 
ongoing war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, loosing of territories, refugee and 
IDPs issue, instability of political regimes, transportation “embargo” of Russia, 
Chechen war and other political reasons caused deepening of the economic crises 
during this period of the transition (Kaynak and Nasirova, 2005, p. 40).  
 Moreover, collapse of Soviet Union caused to the destruction of economic ties with 
other post-Soviet countries, loosing of country’s share in those markets and 
unavailability of subsidies from the central government (Suleymanov, 2008, p. 171). 
In addition, collapse of the “interrepublican trade arrangements” and delaying in 
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“interrepublican payments systems” also leaded to the decline in production 
(Taymas, 1993).  
According to the table 4.1, GDP of 1990 is approximately 2.67 times more than GDP 
volume of 1994. GDP growth rate in the first year of independence had been 
negative, but not in significant level. However, GDP had contracted 21.8% in 
average in other years of this period. Thus, added value in sectors of the economy in 
1995 had decreased sharply in comparison with the corresponding indicators of 
1990. Thus, agriculture was just 32.7% of the 1990 and respectively, manufacturing-
77.5%, industry-64.5% and services-64.3%. On the other hand, total volume of 
export had decreased more than 2.32 times in 1994 in comparison with 1992 - $1.484 
billion  ($730 mln  inter-republic and $754 mln  extra-republic export), mostly due to 
the decrease in export of oil & gas and petroleum products (World Bank, 1995, p. 
78). 
   Table 4.1. Change in main macroeconomic indicators: 1990-1994  
Indicators Years 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
GDP (mln. USD) 
8858.006 8792.366 4991.350 3973.027 3313.739 
GDP growth (%) - -0.7 -22.6 -23.1 -19.7 
Inflation (%) - - 46.2 1128 1662.2 
Source: World BankDatabase 
Hyperinflation as the common issue of this period in most transition countries was 
observed in Azerbaijan also in the following years of price liberalization, 1992. 
Although the inflation rate was 46.2% in 1992, it sharply increased to four digit 
numbers such as the 1662.2% in 1994. And the main cause of hyperinflation was 
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compensation of budget deficits through money printing by Central Bank of the 
country (Kaynak, Nasirova, 2008, p. 41).  
In 1993, a new president came to the government. After the regime change, the 
priority became to achieve the political stability and authority of central government 
over all events within Azerbaijan, under the control of new president - Heydar 
Aliyev. In this context, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed the cease-fire agreement in 
May 1994 which increased attractiveness of the country for the FDIs. Moreover, 
Azerbaijan invited foreign oil companies to invest to its oil sector that resulted by 
signing of the “Contract of Century” on 20th September, 1994. This contract was 
valued as $60 billion, including 33 companies of 15 different countries which 
enhanced Azerbaijan’s place in FDI performance index to the top in following years 
(Bayulgen, 2003, p. 209).  
To sum up, this period was characterized by sharp increase hyperinflation and 
decline in total output. However, establishing of National Bank and National 
currency should be considered as the welcoming events of this period. Anyway, 
initial conditions of the transition period for Azerbaijan were difficult to implement 
reforms for market economy. Consequently, Azerbaijan entered a new period of 
transition in 1995 with two crucial events: the cease-fire agreement and the “Contract 
of Century” which would take the country to a better place.  
4.1.2 Restructuring Period: 1995-2005 
The main target of the government after 1995 was to restructure the destructed 
economy with the effect of recession. Most of the scholars consider this period as 
lasted until 2003 because of the presidency change and new economic program 
toward social-economic development of Azerbaijan’s regions. However, I suggest 
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analyzing of this period until the end of 2005 as done in this research which is the 
year of opening Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In addition, 2005 is the turning point 
in Azerbaijan’s economic development toward high speed economic growth and 
huge positive balance in current account.  
Moreover, Azerbaijan started to implement radical economic policies in 1995 in 
collaboration with IMF under its comprehensive stabilization program due to prevent 
the hyperinflation issue (Baranick and Salayeva, 2005, p. 213).As a result,application 
of exchange rate based orthodox programs became very successful in Azerbaijan to 
reduce the inflation to one digit level within a short time period (Dabrowski, 2003, p. 
17). At the same time, Azerbaijan accomplished to get credits from IMF only after 
implementation of IMF supported stabilization programs, in amount of $219 million 
in December 20, 1996, especially for structural reforms (IMF, 1997, December). 
In addition, adoption of Azerbaijan’s constitution in November 12, 1995 was also 
significant event in terms of establishing juristic base for economic activities. 
Azerbaijan developed its cooperation with the World Bank and other international 
organizations that speeded restructuring of the economy as well. Thus, 31 World 
Bank projects with the value of $726.72 mln in total had been carried out in 
Azerbaijan within this period of the transition (World Bank, 2013). However, 
occupation of 20% of its territory, the refugee and IDPs issue were still essential 
obstacles to restructuring of the economy. Thus, the country had lost a significant 
part of production potential as well as faced with additional unemployment issue in 
terms of refugees and IDPs.  
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Oil industry was restructured within the “Contract of Century” in corporation with 
foreign oil companies. After achieving the stability, government launched reforms in 
economy toward establishing market economic system which required policy 
changes in macroeconomic stabilization, price and trade liberalization, privatization, 
supporting of new entrepreneurs, and development of a supportive juristic base 
(Aslund and Boone, and Johnson, 1996, p. 251). In context of such economic 
policies, government implemented reforms in agriculture such as distribution of land 
among private sector and privatization the property of old “Sovhozes” and 
“Kolhoses” (Thomas, 2006, p. 228).  
However, the land area was distributed among households rather than establishing 
cooperatives in privatization process. In 2002, 96% of “cultivated land” and 98% of 
“livestock inventories” were divided among individual farms and 80% of them did 
farming by themselves, just 1/10 of total land was leased to others (Dudwicket 
al.,2007, p. 34). This kind of privatization and farming prevented establishment of 
cooperatives in agriculture which is required for the better performance in 
international competition.  
In 1995, the parliament of Azerbaijan adopted the privatization program offered by 
the president which aimed to privatize 70% of state enterprises (World Bank, 2008, 
p. 15). Initially, small enterprises and later medium and large ones would be 
privatized through applying the voucher privatization method (World Bank, 2008, p. 
15). Vouchers were distributed among Azerbaijani people that someone would buy 
them in order to private a state enterprise. According to the Transition Report 2005 
of EBRD, the place of private sector in Azerbaijan’s GDP for the mid of 2005 was 
60%. In addition, Azerbaijan’s transition indicator scores (measurement between “1” 
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and “4+”) for 2005 became “2” in large-state privatization and competition policy,  
“4-“ in small-state privatization, “4” in price liberalization and trade & foreign 
exchange system (EBRD, 2005, pp. 3-4).  
Table 4.2: Change in main macroeconomic indicators: 1995-2005 
 GDP 
(mln $) 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Current account 
balance 
(% of GDP) 
1995 3052.4 -11,8 411.75 -13.12 
1996 3176.7 1,3 19.79 -29.31 
1997 3962.7 5,8 3.67 -23.11 
1998 4446.4 10 -0.77 -30.69 
1999 4581.2 7,4 -8.52 -13.09 
2000 5272.6 11,1 1.80 -3.19 
2001 5707.6 9,9 1.54 -0.91 
2002 6236.0 10,6 2.77 -12.32 
2003 7275.7 11,2 2.23 -27.77 
2004 8680.5 10,2 6.70 -29.83 
2005 13245.4 26.4 9.67 1.26 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
As a result of economic reforms and attracting FDIs to the oil sector of Azerbaijan, 
recession period was ended and positive economic growth (out of 1995) was 
observed. This represents itself in the economic indicators of that time as well. 
According to table 4.2, GDP had increased approximately 3 times in 2004 and 4 
times in 2005 in comparison with the GDP of 1995. The inflation rate decreased to 
411% in 1995 from 1662% of the previous year. Moreover, it decreased gradually 
until 2001 and even deflation was observed in 1998 and 1999.  
As a result of liberalization in trade, the volume of import always exceeded the 
amount of export during this period. The proportion of current account deficit to 
GDP had been serious until 1998 or obtaining the first oil within “the Contract of 
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Century”. However, this proportion had increased again after 2001, mainly because 
of the lower oil prices in world market that oil was the most important good in 
country’s export. Moreover, the oil contract and implementation of economic 
reforms enhanced the attractiveness of Azerbaijan for FDIs.  
In addition, according to World Bank Database, the added value had increased 1.57 
times in agriculture, 2.44 times in manufacturing, 8.22 times in industry and 2.94 
times in services in 2005 in comparison with 1995. However, the share of sectors in 
GDP had changed against agriculture (2.75 times), manufacturing (1.78 times) and 
services (1.32 times). In contrast, the share of industry in GDP had increased 1.89 
times within the same time period mainly as a result of the increase in oil & gas 
production. Thus, the share of oil & gas had been 42.2% in GDP, 75% in industry, 
86.5% in total export and 94.2% in FDIs in 2005 (Ciarreta and Nasirov, 2012, p. 
283).  
After the 2003 elections for presidency of Azerbaijan, new president – Ilham Aliyev 
came to the government. He promised to create 600.000 new jobs within the next 5 
years which had been approximately accomplished (Escudero, 2009, p. 10). In 
addition, the “State Program on Social-Economic Development of the Regions of 
Azerbaijan Republic for 2004-2008” was adopted which targeted to decrease the 
social-economic development gap among the regions of Azerbaijan as much as 
possible through supporting the regional developments, encouraging major sectors of 
the regions, producing of export-oriented products, ensuring new job opportunities 
etc (SPSEDR, 2004, pp. 3-4). Therefore, the new trend in historical development of 
Azerbaijan economy was not so far, especially related to the construction and 
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opening of Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan pipeline as well as sharp increase in oil production 
under “the Contract of Century”.  
The evaluation of the restructuring period of Azerbaijan economy may be confused. 
Gaining stability in political environment supported the inflow of FDI and growth in 
economy. If only macroeconomic performance of the country would be analyzed, the 
evolution “score” would be very good. Nevertheless, the detailed analyze indicates 
that this “score” is highly related with the oil production, especially in 2005. 
Therefore, the oil-based development of Azerbaijan may cause additional negative 
effects for other sectors of economy what called as “Dutch Disease”. Despite of oil-
based development and the mistakes done in privatization, particularly in agriculture 
sector that still preserves its negative effects in terms of international 
competitiveness, the path from recession to this level of development under those 
conditions should be considered as a success. In addition, opening of BTC pipeline to 
use in May 2005 would take Azerbaijan to another period of economic development 
called as oil boom period.  
4.1.3 Oil Boom Period: After 2005  
Oil industry is not new for Azerbaijan economy that country was the biggest 
producer of oil in early twentieth century. In addition, Azerbaijan’s rank in oil 
production through modern drilling equipments was at first in the 19
th
 century 
(Smith, 2001, p. 28). Although Azerbaijan started to produce its oil independently 
after the collapse of Soviet Union, there were significant problems in transportation 
and delivering of Azerbaijan oil to the world markets. That is why the oil boom in 
Azerbaijan started after opening of BTC pipeline that solved the issue we mentioned 
above. This pipeline was constructed to deliver Azerbaijan’s oil to the Ceyhan 
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seaport of Turkey through Georgia with 1760 km length and 1 million barrel/day 
export capacity (Cornell and Ismailzade, 2005, p. 61). In addition, the Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline was constructed within 2004-2007 in order to deliver 
Azerbaijan’s gas to Turkish and world market with 30 billion cubic meters gas export 
capacity (Aras and Suleymanov, 2012, p. 228).  
 Opening of BTC pipeline in 2005 sharply increased the oil production and 
exportation which means huge revenues from oil which substantially changed 
structure of the country’s economy. Thus, oil production had been above 42 million 
tons after 2007 and even exceeded 50 billion tons in 2009 and 2010 but, in the 
subsequent years, production level fell and become 43 million tons in 2012 (SOCAR, 
2013). As a result, Azerbaijan’s GDP grew 34.5% in 2006 and 25.05% in 2007. 
However, GDP growth slowed after 2007 which become just 1% in 2011 because of 
the decline in oil production. Despite of the decline, Azerbaijan’s economy grew 
4.45% in 2012.  
This period is also characterized by raising the importance of inflation issue in the 
country. Thus, the inflation increased and became in two digit numbers for the first 
time after 1996 which was the result of high-speed economic growth or over-heating 
of the economy associated with oil production. Revenues of the State Oil Fund of 
Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAZ) which was established to accumulate the revenues 
from oil & gas production became $66.3 billion within 2001-2011 where $64.1 
billion had been gained within 2005-2011 (SOFAZ, 2011, p. 11). And it is predicted 
to become $200 billion until 2024 (Ciarreta and Nasirov, 2012, p. 282). 
Consequently, the huge amount of oil revenues leaded to the sharp increase in state 
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budget or government expenditures through transfers from SOFAZ which raised the 
amount of national currency (manat) in circulation.  
Table 4.3: Change in main macroeconomic indicators: 2006-2012 
 GDP 
(mln $) 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Inflation(%) Current 
account 
balance 
(% of 
GDP) 
2006 20982.3 34.5 8.37 17.67 
2007 33049.4 25.05 16.6 27.3 
2008 48852.5 10.8 20.8 33.7 
2009 44291.5 9.3 1.4 22.97 
2010 52906.0 5 5.86 28.43 
2011 63403.7 1 7.85 27.04 
2012 67197.7 4.45 1.06 22.3 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
In fact, the expenditures of state budget increased 7.2 times in comparison with 2005 
which transfers from SOFAZ consisted 42.5% or $24,800.0 mln of total sum of 
stated budget expenditures ($58,317.8 mln) within 2006-2011(SOFAZ, 2011, p. 19). 
In addition, approximately 15% of state budget’s own revenues were also related 
with oil and non-oil fiscal deficit became 32% of GDP in 2012 (Boyarchuk, 2012, p. 
2). As a result of sharp increase in oil export, current account balance became 
positive, even 33.7% of GDP in 2008 which the share of oil & gas in gross export 
had been more than 90% within 2006-2009 (Ciarreta and Nasirov, 2012, p. 283).  
Distribution of value added GDP among sectors of the economy is also at the center 
of interest. According world development indicators (World Bank, 2013), the value 
added GDP, agriculture, industry and services become respectively 5.07, 3.2, 5.12 
and 5.6 times of 2005 in 2011. Moreover, slight change was observed in proportional 
share of sectors in the country’s GDP. Thus, the share of agriculture in value added 
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GDP had decreased approximately from 9% in 2005 to 5.7% in 2012. In contrast, the 
share of services has increased nearly from 24.4% in 2005 to 27.2% in 2012. The 
change in share of industry is very little (less than one percent) but, it still dominates 
in the economy with 59.4% share in GDP.   
Despite of high level of economic growth, there are still some crucial problems such 
as high level of oil dependence, economic diversification and less development of 
export oriented sectors of the economy. In addition, there is a disbalance distribution 
of labor force and GDP production among sectors of the economy as well as 
difference in labor force earnings regard to this disbalance. Thus, only 1% of the 
total labor force is employed in oil and gas industries and 50% in agriculture 
(Ciarreta and Nasirov, 2012, p. 283). This implies that 50% of total labor force 
produces very small share (5.7%) of GDP while 1% does a significant part. 
Obviously, this is embodied in salary of workers in different sectors as well.  
To sum up, Azerbaijan’s economic development in this period was mostly related to 
the sharp increase in oil production. At first sight, the macroeconomic performance 
may be considered as very good. However, some problems are remaining in its 
economy. Decreasing oil & gas dependence and disbalance among sectors of 
economy as well as establishing a diversified economy with strong export oriented 
industry could take Azerbaijan a better place.  
4.1.4 Graphical Interpretation  
Republic of Azerbaijan is the largest country of its region (South Caucasus) in terms 
of territory, population and economic power. It enjoys favorable geographical 
location as at the crossroads of Asia and Europe and surrounded by Russia on the 
North, Iran on the South, Georgia on the North-West, Armenia on the West, Turkey 
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on the North-West and Caspian Sea on the East. In addition, it has sea borders with 
Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well. Although internationally 
recognized territory of Azerbaijan is 86.6 thousand square kilometers, 20% of this is 
occupied by the Republic of Armenia in 1992-1993. Its population is about 9.4 
million which approximately, one million are refugees and IDPs as a result of 
military conflict with Armenia. The country is rich of natural resources, especially, 
oil and gas. Moreover, Azerbaijan has great potential for agriculture sector and 
development of tourism in terms of climate conditions.  
 
Figure 4.1 Trends in Azerbaijan Economy, millions USD 
All information given above is targeted to create an impression in mind of readers 
about the Republic of Azerbaijan and under which conditions economic development 
of the country was achieved. Here, we will graphically discuss the trend in GDP and 
its components after the end of economic recession, 1994.  We will analyze the 
changes in GDP and GDP components of Azerbaijan economy in two ways: 
including and excluding contribution of oil & gas sector to the GDP, industry and 
export of the country. 
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Figure 4.1 indicates the value of GDP and GDP components in USD which embodies 
the impact of oil & gas sector as well. From the graph, it is clear that not a substantial 
change was observed in both GDP trend and trends in its components until 2004. 
However, because of opening the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in May 2005, 
sharp increase in both GDP and industry sector was seen until 2008.  
Increasing of oil prices has also affected positively GDP value and industrial 
production. Thus, oil price for per barrel increased from $50 in 2007 to $140 in 
summer of 2008 which fell to $40 at the end of the same year (Smith, 2009). That is 
why Azerbaijan’s GDP raised approximately $16 billion in 2008 which was mainly 
sourced from the increase in industrial, more precisely oil production. However, a 
decrease in GDP and industrial production was observed in 2009 as a result of sharp 
fall in oil prices and 2008 Financial Crises in the world economy. After 2009, the 
amount both GDP and industrial production significantly increased. Nevertheless, 
industrial production decreased slightly after 2011 mainly because of the fall in 
amount of oil production.    
On the other hand, no volatility was observed in amount of both agricultural and 
service production during the whole period. Thus, change in agriculture sector has 
been very small in comparison with the GDP growth. However, added value in 
service sector has also substantially risen as parallel to the increase in GDP after 
2005. Hence, added value in service sector has exceeded $18 billion in 2012 which is 
5.6 times of the corresponding value in 2005.  
The export trend is almost on the same line with industry trend because of the oil 
factor. The country has had also increasing import trend, especially after 2005 
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(declined only in 2009). Very huge trade surplus was observed after 2005 which 
reached to $20 billion in 2008 and $22 billion in 2012, mainly because of the oil 
export.  
Although Azerbaijan economy was characterized with high speed economic growth 
until recent years, the growth itself has been at the center of discussions along the 
period, especially after 2005 in terms of the dependency from oil sector. In Figure 
4.2, we have attempted to analyze the GDP, industry and export trends in Azerbaijan 
economy, with and without contribution of oil & gas.  
 
Figure 4.2 Comparative trends in Azerbaijan’s GDP and GDP components, millions 
USD  
Comparative trends indicate that normal and non-oil & gas GDP do not differ so 
much until 2005. However, sharp increase in oil production after 2005 has leaded to 
the expansion of the gap. In 2008, the gap exceeded $25 billion which achieved to 
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$31 billion in 2011. This was represented in industrial production (mining industry) 
and exports of the country as well. 
Thus, the gap between industrial production with and without oil & gas also 
significantly increased after 2005 which became $26 billion in 2008 and $30 billion 
in 2011. As a result, the share of oil & gas production in industry has been 70-80% 
which is considerable very high. In export, the situation is much more crucial. Thus, 
share of oil and gas in total export has been over 70% after 2000 and between 82-
91% in 2005-2011.  
Nevertheless, all these were already expected in context of the “Contract of the 
Century” many years ago. More important question is what kind of non-oil & gas 
trends were observed within this period. According to Figure 4.2, non-oil & gas GDP 
has also grew substantially after 2005. Thus, its value in 2012 is 5 times of in 2005. 
Approximately the same result is also belonging to the change in value of non-oil & 
gas industry within 2005-2012. Moreover, total volume of non-oil-and-gas export 
has also increased 6.7 times (2012) in comparison with 2005.  
On the other hand, the amount of gross capital formation or gross domestic 
investments has had an upward trend during the almost whole period. According to 
World Bank Database, yearly gross capital formation had increased from $0.5 billion 
in 1994 to $5.5 billion in 2005 and nearly $13 billion in 2012. Moreover, the positive 
trend in net FDI flow to the country was also observed during the period. Thus, net 
FDI flow had risen from less than $93 million to approximately $4.5 billion in 2005 
and $5.3 billion in 2012. However, positive trends in Azerbaijan economy were 
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accompanied with the increasing of external debt stocks of the country. Thus, 
Azerbaijan’s external debt reached to $2.2 billion in 2005 and $7.6 billion in 2012.  
Figure 4.3 represents the trend in gross capital formation, net FDI flow and 
accumulation of external debt in Azerbaijan economy.  
 
Figure 4.3 Trends in Azerbaijan Economy, millions USD 
All non-oil & gas trends have slow-speed increasing tendency during the whole 
period. This proves that non-oil & gas sector did not decline in parallel with oil 
production. However, this should not be considered as that other sectors have not 
been affected by sharp increase in oil production and following huge revenues. 
Nevertheless, any research about Azerbaijan economy should take into consideration 
the occupation fact of its 1/5
th
 territory and living in military conditions.   
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4.2 General Outlook of Georgia economy 
Georgia is the another country of South Caucasus region which has borders with 
Azerbaijan in the southeast, Turkey and Armenia in the south, Russia in the north 
and surrounded by the Black Sea in the west. It is the only country of the region with 
direct access to the world ocean. With 69.7 thousand square kilometers territory and 
4.7 million populations, it is the second biggest country in the South Caucasus. The 
shortest way from Asia to Europe passes through the country. As a result, Georgia 
enjoys of main regional projects related to delivering of Azerbaijan oil and gas 
resources to the European market. After gaining independence, Georgia faced with 
Abkhazian and Ossetian ethnic conflicts within its territory. Georgia’s last military 
attempt to solve these conflicts in August 2008 caused to the five-day Russia-
Georgia war which seriously destructed Georgia’s economy. Here, we will analyze 
trends in GDP and GDP components as well as export and import of Georgia before 
and after its accession to WTO (June, 2000).  
 
Figure 4.4 Trends in Georgia’s GDP and GDP components, million USD 
Figure 3.3 Trends in Georgia's GDP and GDP Compositors, millions USD
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Figure 4.4 represents the changes in GDP and GDP components of Georgia in terms 
of added value regard to the sectors. It is clear that Georgian economy has grown 
until 1998. In the subsequent year, a decline was observed in GDP of Georgia. 
However, this decline was followed by slow economic growth until 2003. During the 
period, agricultural production has decreased whereas the share of service sector in 
GDP has gradually increased. Despite of very small fluctuations, neither agriculture 
nor industry significantly changed until 2003.  
According to the Figure 4.4, Georgian membership in WTO did not cause any 
significant increase in GDP production in subsequent years of the accession. When 
we compare GDP indicators and sectoral production before and after 2000, not any 
significant change is observed with the impact of accession in all sectors until 2003. 
The year of 2003 was written to the history of Georgia because of the “Rose 
Revolution” which followed by increasing democracy, decreasing corruption and 
developing of the country’s economy (Papava, 2009, p. 199). As a result, Georgian 
GDP also substantially increased in the following years which exceeded $6 billion in 
2005 and grew approximately $2 billion each year until the end of 2008.  
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Figure 4.5 Trends in Georgia’s international trade, millions USD 
However, the economy declined in 2009, most probably due to the effect of Financial 
Crises of 2008 in world economy. Interestingly, this decline was the result of fall 
mainly in service and partially in industrial production. Nevertheless, the economy 
recovered and grew in subsequent years and reached to nearly $16 billion in 2012. 
The notable point here is that this economic growth was mostly sourced from the 
increase in service production rather than overall development of the economy.  
In fact, agricultural production did not change significantly during all period, even 
decreased in some years. During the same period, its share in GDP fell from 19.3% 
in 2003 to 7.6% in 2012. However, agriculture is still a crucial sector in Georgian 
economy which employees 50% of the country’s population (World Bank). Another 
serious point is achieving of this level of economic growth as parallel to the 
significantly increasing of budget expenses and government debt (Guruli, 2012). 
Thus, foreign debt of Georgia in total has increased three times within 2006-2010 
from $3.8 billion to $9.8 billion which exceeded $11 billion in 2011(Staff, 2012).  
Figure 3.4 Trends in Georgia's International Trade, millions USD 
(1994-2012)
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It is interesting that foreign trade balance of Georgia has been always negative 
(Figure 4.5). In initial years of its independence, both import and had significantly 
declined with the effect of economic recession after the collapse of Soviet Union. In 
subsequent years, export of the country has never substantially increased and became 
always lower than $1 billion before the accession. On the other hand, despite of an 
increase in amount of imports in 1997 which reached to nearly $1.5 billion, it 
decreased and become slightly more than $1 billion in the pre-accession year. 
However, both export and import of the country increased after the accession, 
approximately in the same amount until the end of 2003 or the Rose Revolution in 
Georgia.  
After 2003, import of Georgia increased much more than its exports which expanded 
its trade deficit. Moreover, this yearly deficit also substantially increased every year. 
Especially after the year of 2005, trade deficit of the country exceeded $1 billion 
which reached to nearly $4 billion in 2008. Georgia’s import fell sharply in 2009 in 
comparison with slight decrease in amount of export. However, it still preserve at 
least $2 billion deficit which increased in the following years and become 
approximately $3 billion in 2012. Doubtless, after the end of transitional period for 
application of WTO commitments (2005), Georgia’s international trade significantly 
increased. But, this positive impact became considerable higher over imports in 
comparison with exports.  
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Figure 4.6 Trends in Georgia’s economy, millions USD 
Moreover, the changes in Georgia’s gross capital formation, net FDI flow and 
external debt stocks before and after WTO accession are also interesting. According 
to World Bank database, gross capital formation or gross domestic investments had 
an increasing trend and reached to $0.81 billion before the accession year. In first 
years of its membership, gross capital did not exceed $1 billion as well. Only after 
the Rose Revaluation in 2003, it significantly increased and become more than $3.3 
billion in 2008, before the Financial Crises. Although it sharply fell to $1.4 billion in 
2009, it recovered and reached to $4.3 billion in 2012. 
For the net FDI flow of Georgia, the trend seriously fluctuates. Thus, the amount of 
net FDI had been very few or less than $250 million until 2003. It exceeds $1 billion 
only in 2006-2008 which sharply falls to $0.65 billion in 2009. Although the amount 
of net FDI become more than $1 billion in 2011 again, it can not stay at this level and 
fall to $0.8 billion in 2012. On the other hand, the amount of Georgia’s external debt 
stocks had been lower than $2 billion before the WTO accession and around until 
2005. However, Georgia’s external debt stock increased sharply after 2005, 
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especially in 2008 from $2.9 billion to $7.63 billion. By the end of 2012, Georgia’s 
external debt stock had been more than $13.3 billion (CIA, 2013). 
As a result, the impact of WTO accession on Georgia’s GDP, GDP components and 
international trade should not be considered as only positive. Although the economy 
grew every year (excluding 2009), this growth was not the consequence of 
production increase in all sectors of the economy. In addition, it is questionable that 
how much the WTO membership has impact over the economic growth in terms of 
spurious regression possibility. Moreover, increasing of the trade deficit as well as 
foreign debt of the country implies possibility of serious economic problems in the 
future.  
4.3 General Outlook of Armenia Economy 
Armenia is the last country, situated in South Caucasus region with 29.7 thousand 
square kilometers territory and nearly 3 million populations. It is a land-locked 
country which surrounded by Georgia on the north, Iran on the south, Turkey on the 
west and Azerbaijan on the east. However, the borders of Armenia with Turkey and 
Azerbaijan are blocked due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia. As a result, this has left it out of main regional projects and heavily 
damaged its economy.  
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Figure 4.7 Trends in Armenia’s GDP and GDP components, millions USD 
The country has also faced with economic recession in first years of its 
independence. However, the recession was handled with the foreign support before 
1994. Figure 4.7 represents the trends in Armenia’s GDP and GDP components after 
1994. The graph indicates that Armenia’s GDP has slightly increased within 1994-
2002 which exceeded the value of $2 billion only in 2001 despite of a seven year 
time period. Nevertheless, a relatively sharp increase is observed after 2003 which is 
also the accession year of Armenia to WTO. According to the World Bank data, the 
country’s GDP grew in double-digit percentage until 2009. Its GDP reached to the 
highest level - $11.6 billion in 2008. However, Armenia’s economy declined and fell 
to $8.6 billion in 2009. In following years, the economy was recovered and positive 
growth was observed until 2012. Hence, its GDP decreased again and recorded under 
$10 billion in 2012.  
In context of GDP distribution among sectors of economy, no significant differences 
in amount of sectoral production was observed until 2003. However, sectoral 
production grew much more in industry and service sectors after 2003 and economy 
became industry dominated until 2009. With the effect of the world financial crises, 
Figure 3.5 Trends in Armenia's GDP and GDP compositors, millions USD
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industry declined much more than other sectors in 2009 and lost its dominance. As a 
result, service sector gain the dominance in subsequent years of GDP. On the other 
hand, agricultural production slightly changed during the whole period which 
reached to $1.9 billion in 2008, fell to $1.46 billion in 2009 and re-increased in 
following years but, never exceeded the value of $2 billion.  
 
Figure 4.8 Trends in Armenia’s international trade, millions USD 
The trends in export and import of Armenia before and after its accession to WTO 
are also interesting. These trends are indicated in Figure 4.8. It is observed that 
Armenia has always faced with deficits in foreign trade during the whole period, in 
both before and after its WTO accession. In addition, the amount of both export and 
import of the country had been mainly about or under $1 billion until 2003.  After 
2003 or its WTO accession, imports of the country increased much more in 
comparison with its exports. Especially, imports increased sharply after 2005 and 
trade deficit reached to nearly $3 billion in 2008. Although this deficit decreased in 
the subsequent years, it was still observed above $2 billion.  
Obviously, Armenia’s accession to WTO promoted its imports considerable much 
more than its exports which might not be considered as a good impact in Armenia’s 
Figure 3.6 Trends in Armenia's International Trade, millions USD 
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perspective. Interestingly, both highest level of GDP and trade deficit of Armenia 
were observed in 2008. On the other hand, continuous deficit in foreign trade might 
increase the foreign debt of the country. However, “Armenia's severe trade 
imbalance has been offset somewhat by international aid, remittances from 
Armenians working abroad, and foreign direct investment” and “Armenia is 
particularly dependent on Russian commercial and governmental support” 
(http://www.indexmundi.com/armenia/economy_profile.html).  
 
Figure 4.9 Trends in Armenian economy, millions USD 
Figure 4.9 indicates the trends in Armenia’s gross capital formation, external debt 
stocks and net FDI inflow.  According to the graph, gross capital accumulation 
remains almost the same with ups and downs until 2003. After 2003 or the accession 
year to WTO, gross capital formation trend in Armenia performs a significant 
increase until 2008 and reaches to $4.8 billion.  However, it sharply falls to $3 billion 
in 2009 because of the Crises and follows a slight increase in subsequent years. On 
the other hand, net FDI flow to Armenia has not increased substantially until 2003 as 
well. After 2003, it has had an increasing trend until 2008 and decreasing trend after 
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2008. In general, the amount of net FDI flow to Armenia never reached to $1billion 
during the whole period.  
Indicated last trend in the graph, external debt stocks of Armenia, in total, have had 
an increasing trend throughout the period. Within 1994-2003, total external debt has 
raised from approximately $214 million to $1994 million or nearly $200 million for 
each year. However, external debt stock reached to $7.4 billion in 2011 or increased 
$674 million for each year after 2003. Nevertheless, sharp increase in amount of 
external debt stock was observed after 2008 such as more than $1 billion for each 
year. According to the CIA World Factbook, Armenia’s total external debt stock at 
the end of 2012 is approximately $7.3 billion.  
After all, the impact of WTO accession on Armenia’s economy should not also be 
appraised as positive. Although its GDP grew significantly after the accession, it also 
accompanied by the increasing of dependency from Russian support and support of 
financial institutions and Armenians from abroad. Anyway, total external debt of the 
country is seriously high which exceeds 60% of GDP.  
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Chapter 5 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
During the past period after its creation, WTO has been subject to many studies. 
Various models has been used to estimate the impact of WTO over the international 
trade. Controversial and opposite results was found by many scholars. In this thesis, I 
attempt to estimate the possible impacts of WTO membership for Azerbaijan as a 
nonmember country through a case study and VAR models. Moreover, it is expected 
to evaluate the impacts of WTO membership for two member country (Georgia and 
Armenia) in this study as well. Thus, experience of these countries will be used to 
predict possible impacts for Azerbaijan economy in case of its accession to WTO.  
Until now, WTO and Azerbaijan’s accession process are studied in deep. In this 
thesis in addition to the coverage of the existing studies, I did political and economic 
analysis of Azerbaijan’s macroeconomic performance for the transition period. 
Moreover, I studied Georgia and Armenia economies in a before-and-after WTO 
membership context. All these are aimed to create a general impression about WTO, 
Azerbaijan’s accession and macroeconomic performance of Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Armenia before applying an empirical model.  
5.1 Type and Source of Data 
In the research, the time-period is 1994-2012, 19 years. All data are yearly 
observations within this period and are measured in current USD as indicated in the 
World Bank database. With only some minor exceptions, data for Georgia, Armenia 
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and Azerbaijan have been attained from the “World Development Indicators” 
database of the World Bank. However, the share of mining & quarrying or oil-and-
gas production as percentage of Azerbaijan’s GDP for 1994-2012 has been taken 
from the website of the Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan Republic. After doing 
mathematical calculation based on World Bank data, the result was subtracted from 
the normal GDP in order to find the non-resource data GDP for Azerbaijan. On the 
other hand, the data about the amount of Azerbaijan’s oil export was taken from the 
www.economywatch.com and gas export was attained from the Statistical 
Committee of Azerbaijan Republic. After adding oil and gas export, the result was 
excluded from total export of Azerbaijan due to calculate non-resource export data 
for Azerbaijan.  
5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 Why Georgia and Armenia together with Azerbaijan? 
In this thesis, I will make analysis to find out the expected impacts of accession to 
the WTO for Azerbaijan economy. Azerbaijan is still out of this system and a case 
study will enable to carry out an empirical research of Azerbaijan’s accession to 
WTO through studying economic process in Georgia and Armenia before and after 
their accession to the WTO. Thus, membership experience of Azerbaijan’s neighbor 
countries (Georgia and Armenia) in the same regionwill shed light on the possible 
impacts of such an accession.  
Georgia and Armenia are also situated in the South Caucasus region. In addition, all 
countries of this region had been a part of Soviet Union and centrally planned 
economic system until 1991. Moreover, all of them have faced with severe economic 
crises and hyperinflation in initial years of their independence. Also, all of them 
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ended crises with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) together 
with the World Bank thus showing similarities in economic policies during their 
transition period. In addition, from political point of view, all have unresolved 
regional conflicts which have serious impacts over their economies.  
Nevertheless, there is an important difference among these countries that should be 
noted. Azerbaijan has an advantage of rich natural resources, especially huge oil and 
natural gas reserves which play crucial role in Azerbaijan’s economy. Therefore, it 
would not be appropriate to include all these countries into an empirical analysis with 
natural resource biasedness of Azerbaijan. A solution to this problem is excluding the 
oil-and-gas contribution from the macroeconomic data used for the Azerbaijan’s 
economy. This will happen simply through subtracting the amount of production in 
mining and quarrying industry from GDP and from total industrial production. This 
will produce a data for non-oil-gas economy in Azerbaijan and someone may 
correctly ask about the impact of oil-and-gas production over the production growth 
in other sectors.  
This impact may be both positive (stimulating economy) or negative (resource curse) 
but without loss of generality I assume that there is not any net significant impact of 
oil-and-gas production over other sectors of the Azerbaijan’s economy for the 
interest of this research. Although someone may also emphasize that oil and gas 
production has an impact over import of the country in terms of importing 
technologies and other kinds of capital goods which are used in this field, I will 
assume that this impact is not significant as well. 
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For the analysis, a VAR (Vector Autoregression) model is applied first to estimate 
the impact of WTO membership over the economies of Georgia, Armenia as two 
separate regressions. Then, after subtracting the contribution of oil-and-gas 
production from Azerbaijan’s GDP and total export, a panel data estimation is done 
with economic indicators of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to find out the impact 
of accession to the WTO within a panel. In the above mentioned VAR models, I used 
the data of eliminated-biasedness of oil-and-gas in Azerbaijan economy. Afterwards, 
to analyze the real prevailing situation, I used the original panel data, including oil-
and-gas contribution, and re-estimated the VAR model with the original data.  
5.2.2 Model Variables 
In this research, I use ordinary least squares method to estimate VAR models. With 
this respect, two VAR models are estimated for both Georgia and Armenia. First 
model is an ordinary VAR model and the second one uses first difference data. In 
addition, two other VAR models based on the panel data of the three countries are 
estimated with the above characteristics.  
Accession to the WTO is directly related with international trade, export and import 
are model variables. In addition, WTO accession may increase the attractiveness for 
FDI flow to a new member. That is why I include net FDI flow in the model as 
another variable. Moreover, there is an interrelationship between international trade 
and net FDI flow with GDP and gross capital formation of the countries. In this 
sense, I define both GDP (non oil-and-gas GDP for Azerbaijan) and gross capital 
formation or gross domestic investments as variables of my model as well. On the 
other hand, international trade plays a crucial role in accumulating of external debt 
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stocks of countries if import continuously exceeds export. Accordingly therefore, I 
also include the external debt/GDP ratio as variable into my model.  
I include a binary variable “WTO membership” into the analysis which will get 
“zero” value in years of non-membership and “one” after the year of WTO 
membership as the most important variable in order to find out the impact of WTO 
accession over the economy of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (in case of 
acceding).  
Overall, there are six variables that are regressed on each other within each VAR 
model. They are GDP, EXPORT, IMPORT, NET FDI FLOW, GROSS CAPITAL 
FORMATION, and EXTERNAL DEBT/GDP RATIO. The binary variable WTO 
MEMBERSHIP is used only as an explanatory variable in all regressions.  
5.2.3 Empirical Model 
The impact of WTO over the macroeconomic indicators of the member countries 
after their accession has not been studied sufficiently yet. Although there are 
numerous studies about the impact of WTO over the international trade, I could not 
find any empirical research which tests the relationship between GDP and WTO 
membership. The way of thinking in this paper is that WTO causes to the higher 
trade liberalization, especially for the countries accessed after 1995.On the other 
hand, WTO membership strengthens the competition in domestic economy and 
decreases the application of protection policy tools. Moreover, it is supposed that 
WTO membership makes countries more attractive for the FDIs. In this context, a 
VAR model may be build based on the assumptions that accession to the WTO 
affects directly export, import and net FDI flow and indirectly GDP and external debt 
stock/GDP ratio.  
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Three different VAR models will be applied in this research: VAR model for 
Georgia, VAR model for Armenia and VAR model for panel data estimation. 
However, doing an empirical time series analysis requires stationarity of time series 
data or cointegration among variables of the model. For a VAR model, if the series 
are stationary of the same degree, cointegration must be tested among variables of 
the model. If cointegration exists, then the regression can be done. In this research, I 
will use Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test in order to define whether the series 
of variables are stationary or not.  
Unfortunately, number of observations is not enough to test cointegration in my 
VAR models. That is why I will apply each VAR model in two different forms: first 
with non-stationary series if they are at the same degree of stationary, and second 
with the stationary series after making all series stationary through differencing. First 
forms will enable to find out the impact of WTO membership as a binary variable 
over the other variables of the VAR model with original statistics. Example, how 
much the GDP of Georgia differs after its accession to the WTO in comparison with 
non-membership years? However, this will not solve the question of cointegration. In 
this context, second form will address to solve the issue of cointegration through 
making all variables stationary. Although this will lead missing valuable 
interpretation the impact of WTO membership over the other variables, it will allow 
the statistically and economically significance as well as the sign of the coefficients 
front of the binary variable, WTO_membership.  
Individual VAR Model for Georgia 
a) 
Xi  0.i+ 1.iX1, t 1+ 2.iX2,t 1+ 3.iX3,t 1+ 4.iX4,t 1+ 5.iX5,t 1+ 6.iX6,t 1+ 7.iX7+ i 
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b) 
DXi  8.i+ 9.iDX1, t 1+ 10.iDX2,t 1+ 11.iDX3,t 1+ 12.iDX4,t 1+ 13.iDX5,t 1 
+ 14.iDX6,t 1+ 15.iX7,t 1+ui 
   GEO(Log(GDP), Export, Log(import), NetFDI, Debt_ratio, Gross_capital,     
WTO membership)) 
X1:            
X :           
X3:               
X :          
X :               
X6:                  
X7:                  
Individual VAR Model for Armenia  
a) 
                                                                                    
b) 
DYi  8.i+ 9.iDY1, t 1+ 10.iDY2,t 1+ 11.iDY3,t 1+ 12.iDY4,t 1+ 13.iDY5,t 1                        
+ 14.iDY6,t 1+ 15.iY7,t 1+ i 
    ARM (Log(GDP), Export, Import, NetFDI, D(Debt_ratio), Gross_capital,  
WTO_membership)) 
Y1:            
Y :           
Y3:          
Y :          
Y :                  
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Y6:                  
Y7:                  
Panel data estimation 
In the VAR model for panel data estimation, I will add additionally two binary 
(control) variables:  
          : Equal 1 if a country has sea border and 0 if a country is land-locked. 
Obviously, this variable is 1 for both Azerbaijan and Georgia and 0 for Armenia 
along all period. It is used to control the impact of sea border advantage in terms of 
export (                 ) and import (                 ) opportunities.   
                    : Indicates the amount of neighboring countries from the 
land with open borders for economic transactions. Although Azerbaijan is bordered 
by five countries in land, value of this variable is always 4 for Azerbaijan, because, 
Azerbaijan-Armenia border has been always closed during the taken period in my 
research. In this context, its value s always two for Armenia as a result of closed 
borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey due to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the other 
hand, its value for Georgia is four until Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, and 
three after that year as a result of closing Russia-Georgia borders.  
Panel VAR model: Azerbaijan without contribution of oil-and-gas 
a) 
                                                                                                                
 
b)                                    
DZi  8.i+ 9.iDZ1, t-1+ 10.iDZ2,t-1+ 11.iD 3,t-1+ 12.iDZ4,t-1+ 13.iDZ5,t-1 
+ 
14.i
DZ6,t 1+ 15.iZ7,t 1+ui 
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   Panel (Log(GDP), D(Export), Import, Log(NetFDI), Debt_ratio, 
Gross_capital,Export*Sea_border, Import*Sea_border, Landborder_countries, 
WTO_membership)      
Z1:          
  :           
Z3:       
Z :             
Z :            
Z6:               
Z :                      
Z8:                   
Z9:                      
Z10:               
Panel VAR model: Azerbaijan with contribution of oil-and-gas 
This panel VAR model has almost the same equation structure with the previous one. 
The exceptions  are:  
Z1:          
  :        
Z :                   
5.2.4 Testing for Stationarity: Unit Root Test  
Testing whether the data are stationary or non-stationary is crucial for the time series 
analysis. In this context, I have used Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. 
Because I do my research on the results of three different VAR models each model 
of which is based on different series of data, the unit root test must be implemented 
for each series, individually. For the panel series of data, existence of the unit root is 
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tested through ADF - Fisher Chi-square which assumes individual unit root process 
and Levin-Lin-Chu Test which assumes common unit root process. Here, we test the 
hypothesis whether the time series used is stationary or not. More precisely, the null 
hypothesis is: 
  : The time series has a unit root 
The important thing is the t(=tau) statistic of the given time series data. Thus, if 
calculated absolute value of the t statistics is greater than the absolute value of 
Dickey-Fuller or MacKinnon critical t values, then we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis which means that the time series is stationary (Gujarati, 1995, p.719).  In 
opposite case, this means that the time series has unit root or it is non-stationary. 
Moreover, if the time series becomes stationary after first differencing, this implies 
that the time series which we test is “integrated of order 1” or I(1) and in case of 
differencing twice, it becomes I(2). A stationary series without differencing is I(0).  
5.2.5 Testing for Granger Causality  
Existence of the causality between the variables of a model is essential in order to 
make an acceptable interpretation of that model’s coefficients. In this research,  
Pairwise Granger Causality Test is used to find out if the                
Granger causes other variables of the models. The null hypothesis is:  
  : WTO_MEMBERSHIP does not Granger cause   , 
Where    refers to GDP, Export, Import, Net FDI flow, External Debt/GDP ratio, 
Gross Capital Formation in each separate VAR model.  
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5.2.6 Testing for Statistical Significance  
In this study, t-test is used for statistical significance of coefficients in all VAR 
models. Null hypothesis is: 
Individual VAR models for Georgia:  
  :      
Individual VAR models for Armenia: 
  :      
Panel VAR models: 
  :       
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Chapter 6 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
6.1 Unit Root Test Results 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is used to test if the data series which are used 
in individual VAR models of Georgia and Armenia are stationary. Moreover, ADF - 
Fisher Chi-square and Levin-Lin-Chu tests are used to test the existence of unit root 
in panel data series.  
Table 6.1 indicates Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test results for the series in 
Georgia’s VAR model. The identity of variables are stated in the first column of the 
table. The second and third columns indicates ADF test results. 
Table 6.1 ADF results for Georgia’s VAR model 
 ADF results 
I(0) I(1) 
GDP  1.215633  3.275029   
Export  2.711444  2.599842  
Import  0.762089              
External debt/GDP -0.937487  3.119403   
Net FDI Flow -1.126298  4.487458    
Gross capital formation -0.439015  3.933764    
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
According to the table,  all of time series in Georgia’s VAR model are integrated of 
order one, I(1). GDP and external debt/GDP series of Georgia are I(1) at 5% and 
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10% level of significance, respectively. Import, net FDI flow and gross capital 
formation series are I(1) at even 1% level of significance. Only export is I(1) at 10% 
significance level.  
Table 6.2 represents ADF unit root test results for the series in VAR model for 
Armenia. Test results indicate that all of the series are I(1). More precisely, export 
and import time series are I(1) at 1%, GDP, net FDI flow and gross capital formation 
time series are I(1) at 5% and external debt/GDP ratio is statistically significant at 
10% significance level. 
Table 6.2 ADF results for Armenia’s VAR model 
 ADF results 
I(0) I(1) 
GDP -0.318350  3.636812   
Export 0.677793  3.943350    
Import 0.238543  4.069096    
External debt/GDP -2.656770  2.719158  
Net FDI Flow -1.138930  3.090175   
Gross capital formation -0.649923  3.813000   
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
Unit root test results for series of panel data are indicated in the following table. Both 
ADF Fisher Chi-square and Levin-Lin-Chu test are applied to the panel series with 
and without oil-and-gas contribution. As mentioned above, first test assumes 
individual unit root process where the second one assumes common unit root 
process.  
ADF Fisher Chi-square test results indicate that all series are I(1) except the series of 
export without oil-and-gas contribution. The series of GDP with contribution of oil-
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and-gas is I(1) at 5% level of significance. The series of GDP without oil-and-gas 
contribution and external debt/GDP ratio (with and without oil-and-gas) are I(1) at 
10% level of significance. The series of export (without oil-and-gas), import, net FDI 
flow and gross capital formation are I(1) at 1% level of significance. Only the series 
of export without oil-and-gas contribution is I(1) at 10.91% level of significance. To 
remember, all these results are based on the assumption of individual unit root 
process.  
Table 6.3. Unit root test results for panel data series  
 ADF Fisher Levin-Lin- Chu t* 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
GDP (with oil-and-gas) 0.28622 14.0948   2.65611  3.05615    
GDP (without oil-and-gas) 0.28605 12.2228  2.94592  2.33867    
Export (with oil-and-gas) 0.06785 17.3655    4.05510  3.32179    
Export (without oil-and-gas) 0.04334 10.3928 5.25022 -1.02063 
Import 0.10423 20.1286    3.24592  3.86874    
External debt/GDP (with oil-and-
gas) 
5.91102          -0.23786  2.14289    
External debt/GDP (without oil-
and-gas) 
6.65055 11.9359  -0.63615  2.29864    
Net FDI Flow 3.92238 18.8584    -0.83698  3.13961    
Gross capital formation 0.70032 17.9833    1.93931  3.99097    
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
Levin-Lin-Chu test with the assumption of common unit root process also finds all 
series I(1) except the series of export without contribution of oil-and-gas. According 
to the table 6.3, all series (with and without oil-and-gas) are I(1) at 1% level of 
significance. The only exception, export without oil-and-gas is I(1) at 15% level of 
significance which is considerable higher.  
 
 
99 
 
6.2 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests Results 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests enable to find out the existence of interrelationship 
among the variables of a model. In this sense, here, Granger Causality between each 
pair of variables in both individual and panel VAR models could be tested. However, 
I will focus on existence of Granger Causality between the binary variable, 
               and other variables which are used also as dependent variable. 
In all VAR models,               is used as only explanatory variable. That is 
why test results below express only if                does Granger Cause 
remaining variables.  
The table below consists the Granger Causality test results. The first column 
indicates null hypotheses for each pair test. According to the test results, we can 
reject none of the null hypotheses for the pairs in Georgia’s VAR model. This 
implies that we have not enough evidence to say that                does 
Granger Cause the variables    ,       ,       ,           , 
              and       . 
In case of pairs in Armenia’s VAR model, test results indicate the existence of 
Granger Causality between                -     and                -
               at 5% level of significance, and                -        at 
10% significance level. However, we fail to reject the null hypothesizes that “WTO 
membership does not Granger Cause” export, debt ratio and net FDI flow at even 
10% of significance level. 
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Table 6.4 Granger Causality test results 
Null Hypothesis 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
F statistics 
Georgia Armenia Panel series 
without oil-
and-gas 
Panel series 
with oil-
and-gas 
WTO_MEMBERSHIP does not Granger 
Cause GDP 
0.83034 4.10760             0.29243 
WTO_MEMBERSHIP does not Granger 
Cause EXPORT 
0.27341 0.70564 0.70564 0.24785 
WTO_MEMBERSHIP does not Granger 
Cause IMPORT 
0.72613 2.99573           0.01797 
WTO_MEMBERSHIP does not Granger 
Cause DEBT_RATIO 
0.06468 0.29904 0.29904 0.71192 
WTO_MEMBERSHIP does not Granger 
Cause GROSS_CAPITAL 
0.63021 4.29495   4.29495   0.12197 
WTO_MEMBERSHIP does not Granger 
Cause NETFDI 
1.36068 2.42370 2.42370 0.39382 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
Application of Pairwise Granger Causality tests for the series in panel VAR models 
are represented in the third and fourth columns of the table 6.4. According to the 
table, in case of panel data series without oil-and-gas contribution, 
WTO_MEMBERSHIP does Granger Cause     and               at 5% and 
       at 10% level of significance. Therefore, null hypotheses are rejected for 
these three pairs. However, not enough evidence is found to say that 
               does Granger Cause       ,            and       . 
Consequently, it is failed to reject the hypotheses for those pairs. None of the F 
statistics values are statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level. As a result, all 
hypotheses are failed to be rejected which implies no Granger Causality between 
               and all panel data series with oil-and-gas contribution.  
6.3 Interpretation of VAR Model Results 
As mentioned in previous chapter, VAR model is applied to Georgia, Armenia and a 
panel dataset which include data series of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in order 
to estimate the impact of WTO membership on macroeconomic indicators of Georgia 
101 
 
and Armenia individually, and to predict possible impacts of the membership for 
Azerbaijan economy in case of accession. Following tables show VAR model results. 
Tables with (a) code represent model results with original data series of I(1) without 
differencing. On the other hand, tables with (b) code indicate the model results with 
differentiated series of data which became I(0). In the tables, first row represents the 
dependent and first column independent variables. *, ** and *** implies statistical 
significance of the coefficients at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. First row in all 
tables covers dependent variables and first columuns include independent variables.  
VAR Model Results for Georgia 
Table 6.5 (a) helps to interpret VAR model results for Georgia when all series are 
I(1). According to the model, there is positive and statistically significant impact of 
previous year’s GDP growth and export and negative statistical significant impact of 
previous year’s import growth, external debt/GDP ratio and gross capital formation 
over the economic growth rate of Georgia. Moreover, Georgia’s export is statistically 
significantly affected by previous year’s GDP growth and export level positively, 
and by import growth and external debt/GDP ratio negatively. 
On the other hand, previous year’s GDP growth and export level have statistically 
significant positive where external debt/GDP ratio has statistically significant 
negative impact over import growth rate of Georgia. Moreover, statistically 
significant negative impact of previous year’s external debt/GDP ratio and gross 
capital formation on the net FDI flow to Georgia is found. External debt/GDP ratio 
has been affected positively by previous year’s net FDI flow and its own value 
coefficients of which are both statistically significant. For gross capital formation, 
statistically significant positive impact of previous year’s export and negative impact 
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of previous year’s import growth and external debt/GDP ratio is found. All other 
coefficients are statistically insignificant at 10% level.    
Table 6.5 (a) VAR model results for Georgia 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 15/12/13   Time: 01:22    
Sample (adjusted): 1995 2012    
Included observations: 18 after adjustments  
Standard errors in ( )    
       
       
 LOG(GDP) EXPORT LOG(IMPORT) NETFDI DEBT_RATIO 
GROSS_CAPI
TAL 
       
       LOG(GDP(-1))                                  7.32E+08 0.078211 1.32E+09 
 (0.16290) (5.2E+08) (0.26848) (4.3E+08) (0.13517) (8.5E+08) 
       
EXPORT(-1)                                    0.487851 -8.70E-11             
 (1.2E-10) (0.38519) (2.0E-10) (0.31945) (9.9E-11) (0.62544) 
       
LOG(IMPORT(-1))                         -0.227805 -3.90E+08 -0.061492             
 (0.17891) (5.8E+08)  (0.29487) (4.8E+08) (0.14846) (9.3E+08) 
       
NETFDI(-1) 6.23E-11 -0.318568 -1.31E-10  0.233541           -0.241242 
 (1.4E-10) (0.45389) (2.3E-10) (0.37643) (1.2E-10) (0.73699) 
       
DEBT_RATIO(-1)                                                                           
 (0.30579) (9.8E+08) (0.50398) (8.2E+08) (0.25373) (1.6E+09) 
       
GROSS_CAPITAL 
(-1)              -0.511067 -3.02E-10            7.97E-11 -0.742778 
 (1.1E-10) (0.34302) (1.8E-10) (0.28448) (8.9E-11) (0.55696) 
       
C           -1.11E+09 3.729696 -6.33E+09 -0.530150 1.84E+10 
 (4.59891) (1.5E+10) (7.57970) (1.2E+10) (3.81605) (2.4E+10) 
       
WTO_MEMBERSHI
P                                                                       
 (0.07899) (2.5E+08) (0.13018) (2.1E+08) (0.06554) (4.1E+08) 
       
        R-squared 0.986333 0.981834 0.976514 0.870525 0.872214 0.899645 
 Adj. R-squared 0.976766 0.969118 0.960074 0.779893 0.782764 0.829396 
 Sum sq. Resids 0.094496 9.77E+17 0.256688 6.72E+17 0.065062 2.58E+18 
 S.E. equation 0.097209 3.13E+08 0.160215 2.59E+08 0.080661 5.08E+08 
 F-statistic 103.0977 77.21141 59.39897 9.605033 9.750841 12.80655 
 Log likelihood 21.70524 -372.3387 12.71149 -368.9702 25.06412 -381.0636 
 Akaike AIC -1.522805 42.25985 -0.523499 41.88558 -1.896014 43.22928 
 Schwarz SC -1.127084 42.65557 -0.127778 42.28130 -1.500293 43.62501 
 Mean dependent 22.45950 2.14E+09 21.69120 5.76E+08 0.555211 1.76E+09 
 S.D. dependent 0.637740 1.78E+09 0.801821 5.53E+08 0.173061 1.23E+09 
       
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)6.66E+41 
Determinant resid covariance1.96E+40    
Log likelihood -988.2183    
Akaike information criterion115.1354    
Schwarz criterion117.5097    
       
       Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s own creation 
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According to the model results, WTO membership has had statistically significant 
positive impact on all variables except external debt/GDP ratio for which the impact 
is negative and also statistically significant. Georgia’s GDP and import growth rate  
has been respectively, 33.48% and 51.64% higher after its membership to the WTO 
in comparison with before the membership on average. The amount of its export has 
increased $0.61 billion with the impact of membership at WTO. The membership has 
positively impacted the net FDI flow to and Gross Capital Formation in Georgia in 
considerable amounts ($0.601 billion and $1.03 billion). However, external 
debt/GDP ratio does not differ so much before and after the membership. Although 
the coefficient is statistically significant, the ratio has been just 0.151% lower after 
the membership in comparison with non-membership years. 
The coefficients of                in table 6.5 (a) create positive impression 
about accessing to WTO. However, here, the model assumes existence of 
cointegration without applying a cointegration test which is impossible because of 
insufficient number of observations.  To avoid this problem, all series are made 
stationary through differentiating once and the table 6.5 (b) indicates the results of 
differenced once VAR model for Georgia.  
As a result of differencing once, most of the statistically significant coefficients in 
table 6.5 (a) has become insignificant. Yearly change in GDP growth is negatively 
affected by yearly change in previous year’s external debt/GDP ratio. Yearly export 
change is positively affected by its previous year’s value and negatively impacted by 
yearly change in external debt/GDP ratio of the previous year. In addition, yearly 
change in external debt/GDP ratio of the previous year affects the yearly FDI flow 
negatively, and the yearly change in gross capital formation positively. 
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Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
Differencing once all I(1) series enable to find true effect of the binary variable 
              . According to the results, WTO membership affects only the 
yearly change in GDP growth rate statistically significantly and its sign is positive. It 
has been 21.2% more after the accession as compared to pre-accession period. On the 
Table 6.5 (b) VAR model results for Georgia 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 15/12/13 Time:01:21 
Sample (adjusted): 1996 2012 
Included observations: 17 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) 
  
  
 
 
       
 D(LOG(GDP)) D(EXPORT) 
D(LOG(IMP
ORT)) D(NETFDI) D(DEBT_RATIO) 
D(GROSS_CAPIT
AL) 
       D(LOG(GDP(-
1))) -0.050562 -1.23E+09 -0.546091 -1.44E+09 0.423120  2.92E+09   
 (0.32246) (9.7E+08) (0.55961) (9.9E+08) (0.32435) (1.3E+09) 
       
D(EXPORT(-1)) -6.20E-11 1.500100   -2.49E-10 -0.060918 2.33E-10 1.965732   
 (2.0E-10) (0.59008) (3.4E-10) (0.60021) (2.0E-10) (0.79402) 
       
D(LOG(IMPOR
T(-1))) -0.055776 -7.19E+08 0.274329 2.97E+08 -0.203575 -1.20E+09 
 (0.19139) (5.8E+08) (0.33214) (5.9E+08) (0.19251) (7.8E+08) 
       
D(NETFDI(-1)) 1.78E-10 0.260054 1.01E-11 0.235333 1.15E-10 0.854846 
 (1.4E-10) (0.42978) (2.5E-10) (0.43716) (1.4E-10) (0.57832) 
       
D(DEBT_RATI
O(-1))  0.652375   2.16E+09   -0.975869  2.47E+09   0.538103 5.63E+09    
 (0.33488) (1.0E+09) (0.58116) (1.0E+09) (0.33685) (1.4E+09) 
       
D(GROSS_CAPI
TAL(-1)) -3.93E-11 -0.587311 1.07E-10 -0.200316 -1.03E-10  1.186123   
 (1.2E-10) (0.35517) (2.0E-10) (0.36126) (1.2E-10) (0.47791) 
       
C -0.031125 3.19E+08 -0.026043 1.46E+08 0.057551 6.77E+08   
       
WTO_MEMBE
RSHIP 0.212436  -26687919 0.302585 1.30E+08 -0.142720 2.98E+08 
 (0.10146) (3.1E+08) (0.17608) (3.1E+08) (0.10206) (4.1E+08) 
        R-squared 0.633132 0.643038 0.493392 0.509265 0.434466 0.739299 
 Adj. R-squared 0.347791 0.365401 0.099363 0.127582 -0.005393 0.536532 
 Sum sq. resids 0.117666 1.07E+18 0.354369 1.11E+18 0.119050 1.94E+18 
 S.E. equation 0.114341 3.45E+08 0.198430 3.51E+08 0.115012 4.64E+08 
 F-statistic 2.218860 2.316111 1.252172 1.334263 0.987739 3.646052 
 Log likelihood 18.14958 -352.9109 8.778396 -353.2002 18.05014 -357.9572 
 Akaike AIC -1.194069 42.46011 -0.091576 42.49414 -1.182370 43.05379 
 Schwarz SC -0.801968 42.85221 0.300524 42.88624 -0.790269 43.44589 
 Mean dependent 0.104173 3.28E+08 0.123040 46018395 0.022561 2.49E+08 
 S.D. dependent 0.141583 4.33E+08 0.209089 3.76E+08 0.114703 6.82E+08 
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)3.96E+42     
 Determinant resid covariance 8.73E+40     
 Log likelihood -946.0240     
 Akaike information criterion 116.9440     
 Schwarz criterion 119.2966     
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other hand, the impact of WTO membership is negative for yearly change in export 
which implies decreasing effect however, the coefficient is not statistically  
significant. None of the remaining coefficients are statistically significant as well.  
VAR Model Results for Armenia 
Results of the VAR model for Armenia with I(1) series does not ensure many 
statistically significant coefficients. Armenia’s economic growth rate is affected 
positively by its own value and negatively import of the previous year. Moreover, 
previous year’s GDP growth rate and yearly change in external debt/GDP ratio 
affects Armenia’s export positively but, effect of gross capital formation is negative. 
Yearly change in external debt/GDP ratio affects the Armenia’s import positively as 
well. Net FDI flow to Armenia is affected negatively by the previous year’s import 
and positively by the previous year’s gross capital formation. Moreover, the gross 
capital formation in Armenia is affected by the previous year’s export positively and 
import negatively.  
According to the table 6.6 (a), no evidence is found to claim that WTO membership 
has significant impacts over any of the variables. Interestingly, model results indicate 
that WTO membership has had negative impact on GDP growth rate, import, net FDI 
flow, Gross Capital Formation and first difference of external debt/GDP ratio. 
Positive impact was only found on export. However, none of the coefficients at 
               are statistically significant. Nevertheless, another VAR model is 
done for Armenia because of the same issue, states in previous part for Georgia.  
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Table 6.6 (a) VAR model results for Armenia 
Vector Autoregression Estimates     
Date: 15/12/13   Time: 07:30     
Sample (adjusted): 1996 2012     
Included observations: 17 after adjustments    
Standard errors in ( )    
       
 LOG(GDP) EXPORT IMPORT NETFDI 
D(DEBT_RAT
IO) GROSS_CAPITAL 
       LOG(GDP(-1))                         1.36E+09 3.21E+08 0.036802 6.29E+08 
 (0.31880) (4.1E+08) (1.3E+09) (3.3E+08)  (0.24433) (1.5E+09) 
       
EXPORT(-1) 3.80E-10 0.394535 1.913006 0.284482 -3.50E-10            
 (3.1E-10) (0.40567) (1.29089) (0.32609) (2.4E-10) (1.48978) 
       
IMPORT(-1)             0.154329 -0.558778             1.49E-10              
 (1.5E-10) (0.19429) (0.61825) (0.15617) (1.1E-10) (0.71351) 
       
NETFDI(-1) -1.35E-10 -0.719129 0.163463 -0.091307 -2.06E-10 2.618800 
 (5.4E-10) (0.69448) (2.20996) (0.55825) (4.1E-10) (2.55045) 
       
D(DEBT_RATIO(
-1)) 0.370531                      2.39E+08 -0.204648 2.95E+09 
 (0.33939) (4.4E+08) (1.4E+09) (3.5E+08) (0.26011) (1.6E+09) 
       
GROSS_CAPITA
L(-1) -1.82E-11              0.137773            6.49E-11 0.932720 
 (1.1E-10) (0.14167) (0.45083) (0.11388) (8.4E-11) (0.52029) 
       
C -8.447212           -2.86E+10 -6.64E+09 -0.708048 -1.31E+10 
 (6.70521) (8.7E+09) (2.8E+10) (7.0E+09) (5.13889) (3.2E+10) 
       
WTO_MEMBERS
HIP -0.000847 2814679 -3.45E+08 -1.02E+08 -0.100289 -6.49E+08 
 (0.10234) (1.3E+08) (4.2E+08) (1.1E+08) (0.07844) (4.9E+08) 
       R-squared 0.992403 0.986181 0.970224 0.943973 0.770133 0.955438 
Adj. R-squared 0.986493 0.975432 0.947065 0.900396 0.591347 0.920779 
Sum sq. resids 0.070162 1.18E+17 1.20E+18 7.64E+16 0.041211 1.59E+18 
S.E. equation 0.088294 1.15E+08 3.65E+08 92112457 0.067669 4.21E+08 
F-statistic 167.9436 91.75152 41.89395 21.66228 4.307575 27.56650 
Log likelihood 22.54442 -334.1832 -353.8617 -330.4709 27.06722 -356.2977 
Akaike AIC -1.711108 40.25685 42.57196 39.82011 -2.243203 42.85855 
Schwarz SC -1.319008 40.64895 42.96406 40.21221 -1.851103 43.25065 
Mean dependent 22.12896 1.16E+09 2.38E+09 3.47E+08 0.028433 1.70E+09 
S.D. dependent 0.759725 7.31E+08 1.58E+09 2.92E+08 0.105855 1.50E+09 
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 7.42E+58 
 Determinant resid covariance 1.63E+57     
 Log likelihood -1264.508     
 Akaike information criterion 154.4128     
 Schwarz criterion 156.7654     
       Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
Table 6.6 (b) indicates VAR model results for Armenia with once differentiated 
series of data. According to these results, the impact of yearly change in previous 
year’s import over yearly change in GDP growth rate is negative and statistically 
significant while remaining coefficients are insignificant. Yearly export change is 
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positively affected by previous year’s value of its own and import which the last does 
not make sense economically.  
Statistically significant impact of                is found only over the yearly 
change in export and import. Both coefficients are positive but, import change is 2.15 
times more (5.68 2.63 ) than the change in export as a result of the membership. This 
remembers the trends in Armenia’s export and import volumes before and after their 
accession to WTO in chapter 4. 
Table 6.6 (b) VAR model results for Armenia 
Vector Autoregression Estimates     
Date: 16/12/13   Time: 01:30     
Sample (adjusted): 1996 2012     
Included observations: 17 after adjustments    
Standard errors in ( )    
       
 D(LOG(GDP)) D(EXPORT) D(IMPORT) D(NETFDI) 
D(DEBT_RA
TIO) D(GROSS_CAPITAL) 
       
D(LOG(GDP(-1))) 0.872898 1.64E+08 2.56E+09 7.43E+08 -0.663798 4.50E+09 
 (0.73643) (7.0E+08) (2.7E+09) (7.4E+08) (0.56821) (3.6E+09) 
       
D(EXPORT(-1)) 3.92E-10            1.655049 0.153761 -2.67E-10 2.147775 
 (2.9E-10) (0.27257) (1.06641) (0.29003) (2.2E-10) (1.39751) 
       
D(IMPORT(-1))                                    -0.388616 2.29E-10 -2.083515 
 (2.7E-10) (0.25955) (1.01548) (0.27618) (2.1E-10) (1.33077) 
       
D(NETFDI(-1)) 1.31E-10 0.213978 0.807007 -0.406797 -4.34E-11 1.790721 
 (4.8E-10) (0.45831) (1.79312) (0.48767) (3.7E-10) (2.34985) 
       
D(DEBT_RATIO(-1)) 0.008667 4.85E+08 2.85E+09 2.98E+08 0.036072 1.86E+09 
 (0.53512) (5.1E+08) (2.0E+09) (5.4E+08) (0.41289) (2.6E+09) 
       
D(GROSS_CAPITAL(-
1)) 1.33E-10 0.119668 0.669346 0.272715 4.69E-11 0.057274 
 (2.3E-10) (0.21549) (0.84309) (0.22929) (1.8E-10) (1.10485) 
       
C 0.005601 -576988.4 -3.68E+08 -59878235 0.109443 -4.23E+08 
 (0.08544) (8.1E+07) (3.2E+08) (8.6E+07) (0.06593) (4.2E+08) 
       
WTO_MEMBERSHIP 0.119706                       51874470 -0.055318 2.90E+08 
 (0.07953) (7.5E+07) (3.0E+08) (8.0E+07) (0.06136) (3.9E+08) 
       
R-squared 0.671228 0.856741 0.557944 0.588290 0.576413 0.554442 
Adj. R-squared 0.415517 0.745317 0.214123 0.268072 0.246956 0.207897 
Sum sq. resids 0.127561 1.15E+17 1.76E+18 1.30E+17 0.075942 3.02E+18 
S.E. equation 0.119052 1.13E+08 4.42E+08 1.20E+08 0.091859 5.79E+08 
F-statistic 2.624943 7.689042 1.622773 1.837153 1.749586 1.599912 
Log likelihood 17.46325 -333.9303 -357.1210 -334.9858 21.87154 -361.7177 
Akaike AIC -1.113324 40.22709 42.95541 40.35127 -1.631946 43.49620 
Schwarz SC -0.721223 40.61919 43.34751 40.74337 -1.239845 43.88830 
Mean dependent 0.112322 1.25E+08 2.31E+08 27279804 0.028433 1.82E+08 
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S.D. dependent 0.155722 2.24E+08 4.98E+08 1.40E+08 0.105855 6.50E+08 
       
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 9.73E+59     
Determinant resid covariance 2.14E+58     
Log likelihood -1286.381     
Akaike information criterion 156.9860     
Schwarz criterion 159.3386     
       
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
Panel VAR Model Results 
As mentioned above, panel VAR model is applied to the panel data with and without 
oil-and-gas contribution in Azerbaijan economy of which each has done with I(1) 
series at first and I(0) after  differencing once.  Thus, there is a considerable oil-and-
gas contribution in Azerbaijan’s GDP and export, and external debt/GDP ratio as a 
result of the division.    
Without Contribution of Oil-and-Gas 
Table 6.7 (a) consists of VAR model results based on the panel data which oil-and-
gas contribution has been excluded from the series on Azerbaijan. Interpreting in  
short, previous year’s GDP growth affects its own value, gross capital formation and 
imports positively. Previous year’s external debt/GDP ratio has statistically 
significant impact on only its own value. Gross capital formation in previous year 
affects GDP growth, its own value and the import positively but, the impact is 
negative on the external  debt/GDP ratio. However, it is found that import has 
negative significant impact over GDP growth rate and gross capital formation. 
Impact of the growth in net FDI flow is only statistically significant over its own 
value. Interaction variables (D(EXPORT)*SEA_BORDER, IMPORT*SEA_ 
BORDER) and another binary variable (LANDBORDER_ COUNTRIES) in the 
model shows that having sea borders affects the impact of yearly export change over 
GDP growth negatively. Moreover, that affects significantly and positively the 
impact of import over GDP growth, gross capital and the growth in net FDI flow. 
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Interestingly, model results indicate significantly negative impact of opening land 
borders with a country over GDP growth, gross capital and import.  
Table 6.7 (a) Panel VAR model results without contrubition of oil-and-gas 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates 
 Date: 18/12/13   Time: 03:22     
 Sample (adjusted): 1996 2012     
 Included observations: 51 after adjustments    
 Standard errors in ( )    
       
       
 LOG(GDP) D(EXPORT) DEBT_RATIO 
GROSS_CAP
ITAL IMPORT LOG(NETFDI) 
       
       LOG(GDP(-1))  1.014864
     31920057  0.043592  1.01E+09
    1.36E+09     0.715471 
  (0.10356)  (1.2E+08)  (0.07854)  (4.9E+08)  (3.9E+08)  (0.51548) 
       
D(EXPORT(-1))  5.40E-11  0.015811 -3.39E-11  0.356713  0.276294  1.12E-10 
  (5.8E-11)  (0.06595)  (4.4E-11)  (0.27396)  (0.22036)  (2.9E-10) 
       
DEBT_RATIO(-1) -0.099590  2.75E+08  0.813785     4.08E+08  3581147. -0.582390 
  (0.14202)  (1.6E+08)  (0.10770)  (6.7E+08)  (5.4E+08)  (0.70692) 
       
GROSS_CAPITAL
(-1)  7.59E-11
  
  0.026073  5.97E 11    1.254326
     0.369497     1.74E-10 
  (3.2E-11)  (0.03579)  (2.4E-11)  (0.14865)  (0.11957)  (1.6E-10) 
       
IMPORT(-1)  1.53E 10    -0.035359  6.28E-11  0.848249    -0.188637 -4.30E-10 
  (5.3E-11)  (0.06043)  (4.0E-11)  (0.25102)  (0.20191)  (2.7E-10) 
       
LOG(NETFDI(-1)) -0.001538  21139001  0.007128  33462917  1.04E+08  0.565341
    
  (0.02168)  (2.5E+07)  (0.01644)  (1.0E+08)  (8.2E+07)  (0.10789) 
       
C  0.207170 -9.73E+08 -0.986724 -2.04E+10  2.83E+10    -6.176550 
  (2.03518)  (2.3E+09)  (1.54343)  (9.6E+09)  (7.7E+09)  (10.1304) 
       
D(EXPORT)*SEA_
BORDER  1.58E 10    0.992550
     2.57E-11 -0.003770            -3.15E-10 
  (6.4E-11)  (0.07260)  (4.9E-11)  (0.30160)  (0.24259)  (3.2E-10) 
       
IMPORT*SEA_BO
RDER  1.06E-10
   
  0.001303 -2.73E-11  0.416251     0.553364     2.48E-10
 
 
  (2.6E-11)  (0.02969)  (2.0E-11)  (0.12333)  (0.09920)  (1.3E-10) 
       
LANDBORDER_C
OUNTRIES  0.110184    -50995967  0.000540  4.76E+08     6.62E+08    -0.121412 
  (0.03668)  (4.2E+07)  (0.02782)  (1.7E+08)  (1.4E+08)  (0.18260) 
       
WTO_MEMBERS
HIP  0.133980
   -29344525 -0.046559 -3.50E+08 -1.46E+08  0.068605 
  (0.06147)  (7.0E+07)  (0.04662)  (2.9E+08)  (2.3E+08)  (0.30600) 
       
        R-squared  0.983080  0.970769  0.826730  0.970418  0.988938  0.857110 
 Adj. R-squared  0.978850  0.963461  0.783413  0.963022  0.986173  0.821388 
 Sum sq. resids  0.571120  7.35E+17  0.328470  1.27E+19  8.21E+18  14.15065 
 S.E. equation  0.119491  1.36E+08  0.090619  5.63E+08  4.53E+08  0.594782 
 F-statistic  232.4105  132.8415  19.08541  131.2155  357.6094  23.99360 
 Log likelihood  42.17964 -1021.156  56.28508 -1093.785 -1082.681 -39.67320 
 Akaike AIC -1.222731  40.47671 -1.775886  43.32489  42.88947  1.987184 
 Schwarz SC -0.806063  40.89338 -1.359217  43.74156  43.30614  2.403853 
 Mean dependent  22.50273  3.42E+08  0.453312  2.90E+09  4.30E+09  20.08553 
 S.D. dependent  0.821641  7.09E+08  0.194716  2.93E+09  3.85E+09  1.407351 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)1.57E+45   
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 Determinant resid covariance  3.67E+44 
-3050.818 
 122.2281 
 124.7282 
   
 Log likelihood    
 Akaike information criterion    
 Schwarz criterion    
       
       
Note: *, ** and *** 
denote significance level 
of 10 percent, 5 percent 
and 1 percent levels, 
respectively.  
Source: Author’s own 
creation 
 
      t : *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
However, the focus in the table is toward the coefficients of WTO_MEMBERSHIP 
which have statistically siginificant impact on only the GDP growth rate. It implies 
that the GDP growth in countries within the panel has been 13.39% higher after their 
membership in comparison with non-membership year’s growth. This impact over 
remaining variables is statistically insignficant and negative for yearly export change, 
external debt/GDP ratio, gross capital formation and import. The impact over growth 
in net FDI flow is positive but statistically insignificant.  
After differencing once all series used in table 6.7 (a), VAR model indicates the 
results with stationary series of data which are indicated in table 6.7 (b). Although 
differencing of the series make most of the coefficients insignificant, it is still useful 
to find out the true sign of the impact of WTO_membership over yearly change in 
other variables. Because export has been twice-differenced to make it stationary, it 
does not make sense for interpretation. Here, positive impact of previous year’s GDP 
growth is found again over its own value. Again, the impact of yearly import over  
yearly change in GDP growth, gross capital and import has been found higher if the 
state have sea borders. All coefficients of the binary variable WTO_MEMBERSHIP 
as the primary focus are statistically and insignificant.  
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Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.   
Source: Author’s own creation. 
Table 6.7 (b) Panel VAR model results without contrubition of oil-and-gas 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 18/12/13   Time: 03:20     
Sample (adjusted): 1997 2012     
Included observations: 48 after adjustments    
Standard errors in ( )    
       
       
 
D(LOG(GDP
)) 
D(EXPORT,
2) 
D(DEBT_R
ATIO) 
D(GROSS_C
APITAL) D(IMPORT) 
D(LOG(NETF
DI)) 
       
       D(LOG(GDP(-1)))  0.453758
  -2.69E+08  0.069834  3.48E+08  8.84E+08 -1.222159 
  (0.23232)  (3.2E+08)  (0.18799)  (9.9E+08)  (5.8E+08)  (1.18879) 
       
D(EXPORT(-1),2)  1.41E-11 -0.028903 -4.35E-11  0.150289  0.234661   7.43E-11 
  (5.4E-11)  (0.07427)  (4.4E-11)  (0.23050)  (0.13516)  (2.8E-10) 
       
D(DEBT_RATIO(-1)) -0.284835  2.59E+08  0.427861 -1.24E+09  3.37E+08 -2.237128 
  (0.31015)  (4.3E+08)  (0.25097)  (1.3E+09)  (7.8E+08)  (1.58706) 
       
D(GROSS_CAPITAL(-1)) -5.81E-11  0.140164   1.49E-11 -0.169783 -0.027978  2.65E-11 
  (6.1E-11)  (0.08374)  (4.9E-11)  (0.25990)  (0.15240)  (3.1E-10) 
       
D(IMPORT(-1)) -3.96E-11  0.026929  3.37E-12 -0.064119 -0.147892 -1.00E-10 
  (5.1E-11)  (0.07073)  (4.1E-11)  (0.21950)  (0.12871)  (2.6E-10) 
       
D(LOG(NETFDI(-1))) -0.009096  41834100  0.008135  18318848  1737776.  0.191597 
  (0.02895)  (4.0E+07)  (0.02342)  (1.2E+08)  (7.3E+07)  (0.14812) 
       
C  0.091977  61977658  0.029570  4.91E+08  2.40E+08  0.522197 
  (0.08852)  (1.2E+08)  (0.07163)  (3.8E+08)  (2.2E+08)  (0.45296) 
       
D(EXPORT,2)*SEA_BOR
DER  1.32E 10   0.827130    -2.51E-11 -0.189783 -0.037639  9.67E-12 
  (7.0E-11)  (0.09608)  (5.6E-11)  (0.29818)  (0.17484)  (3.6E-10) 
       
D(IMPORT)*SEA_BORD
ER  1.15E-10
   
  0.083497  2.08E-12  0.638957     1.003540
     1.04E-10 
  (3.7E-11)  (0.05047)  (3.0E-11)  (0.15663)  (0.09185)  (1.9E-10) 
       
LANDBORDER_COUNT
RIES -0.009273 -4639256. -0.006236 -91293956 -83279884 -0.067537 
  (0.02228)  (3.1E+07)  (0.01802)  (9.5E+07)  (5.6E+07)  (0.11398) 
       
WTO_MEMBERSHIP  0.017505 -26715475 -0.021710 -1.26E+08  1.09E+08  0.000800 
  (0.03926)  (5.4E+07)  (0.03177)  (1.7E+08)  (9.9E+07)  (0.20092) 
       
        R-squared  0.432673  0.926609  0.180392  0.640791  0.933767  0.212781 
 Adj. R-squared  0.279341  0.906773 -0.041124  0.543707  0.915866  0.000020 
 Sum sq. resids  0.551656  1.05E+18  0.361211  1.01E+19  3.48E+18  14.44451 
 S.E. equation  0.122105  1.68E+08  0.098805  5.23E+08  3.07E+08  0.624814 
 F-statistic  2.821811  46.71477  0.814352  6.600408  52.16316  1.000092 
 Log likelihood  39.07571 -971.0857  49.23877 -1025.447 -999.8244 -39.28777 
 Akaike AIC -1.169821  40.92024 -1.593282  43.18527  42.11768  2.095324 
 Schwarz SC -0.741004  41.34905 -1.164465  43.61409  42.54650  2.524140 
 Mean dependent  0.126290  99954503  0.017889  3.90E+08  5.88E+08  0.169640 
 S.D. dependent  0.143836  5.52E+08  0.096834  7.74E+08  1.06E+09  0.624820 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.97E+45   
 Determinant resid covariance  4.12E+44     
 Log likelihood -2874.180     
 Akaike information criterion  122.5075     
 Schwarz criterion  125.0804     
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With Contribution of Oil-and-Gas 
The results in table 6.8 (a) indicate VAR model coefficients which include GDP and 
export with the contribution of oil-and-gas. According to the table, previous year’s 
GDP growth positively affects all other variable and all coefficients are statistically 
significant except the coefficient for external debt/GDP ratio. Unexpectedly, 
previous year’s export is found to have negative and significant impact over GDP 
growth. Results indicate that  previous year’s import negatively affects the growth in 
amount of net FDI flow as well as gross capital formation. Moreover, previous year’s 
growth in net FDI flow has positive and significant impact on its own value. 
On the other hand, the change in external debt/GDP ratio affects negatively the 
growth in net FDI flow and positively its own value. Growth capital formation has 
positive and significant impact over import, the growth rate in net FD flow and its 
own value. According to the table, the impact of export is significantly higher over 
GDP growth, and significantly lower over growth in net FDI flow if the state has sea 
borders. Moreover, positive additional impact of import is found if the state has sear 
borders. Again interestingly, the effect of number of land border countries over 
export, import, growth in net FDI flow and gross capital formation is found 
statistically significant and negative.  
The impact of WTO membership on other variables is only significant for GDP 
growth rate. This means that GDP growth rate in the countries of the panel has been 
11.06% higher after their accession to WTO in comparison with pre accession 
period. Although all other coefficients are insignificant, WTO membership seems to 
affect positively the export, import and growth in net FDI flow and negatively the  
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Table 6.8 (a) Panel VAR model results with contrubition of oil-and-gas 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 18/12/13   Time: 03:11     
Sample (adjusted): 1995 2012     
Included observations: 54 after adjustments    
Standard errors in ( )    
       
       
 LOG(GDP) EXPORT IMPORT 
LOG(NETF
DI) 
DEBT_RATI
O 
GROSS_CAPITA
L 
       
       LOG(GDP(-1))  0.921571
     5.18E+08     1.13E+09     1.224404     0.014534  8.51E+08
   
  (0.08810)  (1.8E+08)  (3.4E+08)  (0.37955)  (0.05968)  (3.7E+08) 
       
EXPORT(-1)  2.21E 11   -0.011047 -0.052217  3.26E-12 -4.28E-12  0.002847 
  (9.6E-12)  (0.01987)  (0.03694)  (4.1E-11)  (6.5E-12)  (0.04060) 
       
IMPORT(-1) -2.62E-11 -0.039571 -0.091297  6.18E 10     2.78E-11  0.547188    
  (4.1E-11)  (0.08571)  (0.15934)  (1.8E-10)  (2.8E-11)  (0.17510) 
       
LOG(NETFDI(-1))  0.024998  3337669. -79611305  0.398685    -0.003229 -13942408 
  (0.02219)  (4.6E+07)  (8.5E+07)  (0.09560)  (0.01503)  (9.4E+07) 
       
DEBT_RATIO(-1) -0.139496  1.51E+08 -72651010  1.265163    0.862661
     72366132 
  (0.14501)  (3.0E+08)  (5.6E+08)  (0.62473)  (0.09824)  (6.1E+08) 
       
GROSS_CAPITAL(-1)  1.25E-11  0.113204  0.403262    3.23E 10  -6.22E-12  0.971334    
  (4.5E-11)  (0.09285)  (0.17261)  (1.9E-10)  (3.0E-11)  (0.18968) 
       
C  1.478047  9.85E+09     1.99E+10     13.37470  -0.137446  1.63E+10   
  (1.74609)  (3.6E+09)  (6.7E+09)  (7.52254)  (1.18287)  (7.4E+09) 
       
EXPORT*SEA_BORDE
R              1.015063     0.015162  8.89E 11   -5.03E-12  0.022839 
 (1.0E-11)  (0.02063)  (0.03834)  (4.3E-11)  (6.8E-12)  (0.04214) 
       
IMPORT*SEA_BORDE
R  2.27E-11  0.168906     0.660314
     3.73E-10
   
 -2.26E-12  0.320629
    
  (2.3E-11)  (0.04684)  (0.08708)  (9.8E-11)  (1.5E-11)  (0.09569) 
       
LANDBORDER_COUN
TRIES -0.029386  3.63E+08     7.57E+08     0.280915  -0.022271  4.05E+08    
  (0.03312)  (6.8E+07)  (1.3E+08)  (0.14268)  (0.02243)  (1.4E+08) 
       
WTO_MEMBERSHIP  0.110674   1.39E+08  2.43E+08  0.057486 -0.036796 -43244446 
  (0.06128)  (1.3E+08)  (2.4E+08)  (0.26400)  (0.04151)  (2.6E+08) 
       
        R-squared  0.985060  0.999346  0.985297  0.888063  0.867049  0.969388 
 Adj. R-squared  0.981585  0.999195  0.981877  0.862031  0.836130  0.962269 
 Sum sq. resids  0.768727  3.28E+18  1.13E+19  14.26822  0.352791  1.37E+19 
 S.E. equation  0.133706  2.76E+08  5.14E+08  0.576037  0.090578  5.64E+08 
 F-statistic  283.5147  6575.535  288.1495  34.11436  28.04266  136.1694 
 Log likelihood  38.18142 -1120.063 -1153.544 -40.68705  59.21060 -1158.638 
 Akaike AIC -1.006719  41.89121  43.13126  1.914335 -1.785578  43.31992 
 Schwarz SC -0.601556  42.29637  43.53643  2.319499 -1.380415  43.72508 
 Mean dependent  22.58821  5.30E+09  4.12E+09  19.93738  0.414496  2.76E+09 
 S.D. dependent  0.985304  9.73E+09  3.81E+09  1.550813  0.223756  2.91E+09 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 4.55E+45 
 Determinant resid covariance  1.16E+45 
-3261.364 
 123.2357 
  
 Log likelihood   
 Akaike information criterion   
 Schwarz criterion  125.6667   
       
       Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
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external debt/GDP ratio and gross capital formation. Interestingly, this insignificant 
impact is 1.74 times (
 2.43E+08
 1.39E+08
  ) higher over import in comparison the 
export.   
On the other hand, table 6.8 (b) represents the results of panel VAR model which 
cover contribution of oil-and-gas as well. According to the table, in short, only a few 
coefficients are statistically significant. Yearly change in previous year’s external 
debt/GAT ratio statistically significantly and positively affects the change in its own 
value. Moreover, the impact of yearly change in previous year’s gross capital 
formation over yearly change in export is also found statistically significant at 10% 
which is negative. In addition, results indicate that the impact of yearly change in 
import over yearly change in amount of gross capital formation is higher if the state 
has sea borders. In this table, the impact of amount of land border countries which 
the borders are open to economic transactions is found negative over export and 
import. None of the coefficients at WTO_membership is statistically significant. 
However, the sign of coefficients is positive for yearly change in GDP growth, 
export and import and negative for yearly change in growth of net FDI flow, external 
debt/GDP ratio and gross capital formation. 
Despite of differences in WTO_membership coefficients, general conclusion implies 
that we have not enough evidence to claim that accession to WTO has been good for 
Georgia and Armenia. Panel VAR models also fails to find significant impact of 
WTO membership over included macroeconomic indicators.  
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Table 6.8 (b) Panel VAR model results with contrubition of oil-and-gas 
Vector Autoregression Estimates 
Date: 18/12/13   Time: 03:16     
Sample (adjusted): 1996 2012     
Included observations: 51 after adjustments    
Standard errors in ( )    
       
       
 
D(LOG(GDP
)) D(EXPORT) D(IMPORT) 
D(LOG(NET
FDI)) 
D(DEBT_RAT
IO) 
D(GROSS_CAPI
TAL) 
       
       D(LOG(GDP(-1)))  0.266036 -2.16E+08  3.31E+08 -0.885915  0.181394 -4.07E+08 
  (0.25034)  (2.5E+08)  (6.0E+08)  (1.27352)  (0.18025)  (9.8E+08) 
       
D(EXPORT(-1))  9.58E-13  0.015010  0.007956  2.10E-11 -1.20E-11  0.058017 
  (1.1E-11)  (0.01056)  (0.02546)  (5.4E-11)  (7.6E-12)  (0.04146) 
       
D(IMPORT(-1)) -2.61E-12  0.027378 -0.047638 -2.67E-10 1.68E-11 -0.077925 
  (4.2E-11)  (0.04209)  (0.10146)  (2.1E-10) (3.0E-11)  (0.16524) 
       
D(LOG(NETFDI(-1)))  0.004155  10667310  16726424  0.095823 -0.001379  31468590 
  (0.02430)  (2.4E+07)  (5.9E+07)  (0.12363)  (0.01750)  (9.5E+07) 
       
D(DEBT_RATIO(-1)) -0.517469 -2.91E+08 -24741938 -2.599889  0.486465
   -1.95E+09 
  (0.32073)  (3.2E+08)  (7.7E+08)  (1.63166)  (0.23094)  (1.3E+09) 
       
D(GROSS_CAPITAL(
-1)) -5.36E-11  0.107541  -0.014807  1.11E-10  4.09E-12 -0.088208 
  (6.2E-11)  (0.06246)  (0.15056)  (3.2E-10)  (4.5E-11)  (0.24520) 
       
C  0.089219  2.52E+08
     3.10E+08  0.453097  0.016065  5.52E+08 
  (0.08830)  (8.8E+07)  (2.1E+08)  (0.44919)  (0.06358)  (3.5E+08) 
       
D(EXPORT)*SEA_B
ORDER  1.77E-11  1.002169    -0.003332 -4.85E-11 -4.96E-12  0.000826 
  (1.2E-11)  (0.01179)  (0.02841)  (6.0E-11)  (8.5E-12)  (0.04628) 
       
D(IMPORT)*SEA_B
ORDER  2.41E-11 -0.011343  1.006618     1.99E-10  4.39E-12  0.530905    
  (3.5E-11)  (0.03515)  (0.08472)  (1.8E-10)  (2.5E-11)  (0.13797) 
       
LANDBORDER_CO
UNTRIES -0.001765                        -0.024062 -0.003699 -95116283 
  (0.02200)  (2.2E+07)  (5.3E+07)  (0.11191)  (0.01584)  (8.6E+07) 
       
WTO_MEMBERSHIP  0.028126  33887762  1.14E+08 -0.046292 -0.033260 -59629529 
  (0.04340)  (4.3E+07)  (1.0E+08)  (0.22076)  (0.03125)  (1.7E+08) 
       
        R-squared  0.450878  0.998467  0.928981  0.263438  0.205468  0.644991 
 Adj. R-squared  0.313597  0.998083  0.911227  0.079297  0.006835  0.556239 
 Sum sq. resids  0.652656  6.52E+17  3.79E+18  16.89089  0.338374  1.01E+19 
 S.E. equation  0.127736  1.28E+08  3.08E+08  0.649825  0.091975  5.01E+08 
 F-statistic  3.284351  2604.712  52.32313  1.430635  1.034413  7.267334 
 Log likelihood  38.77665 -1018.092 -1062.963 -44.18706  55.52761 -1087.837 
 Akaike AIC -1.089281  40.35654  42.11620  2.164199 -1.746181  43.09167 
 Schwarz SC -0.672612  40.77321  42.53287  2.580867 -1.329513  43.50833 
 Mean dependent  0.132786  9.17E+08  5.60E+08  0.208359  0.017156  3.81E+08 
 S.D. dependent  0.154178  2.92E+09  1.03E+09  0.677231  0.092291  7.53E+08 
       
        Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.10E+45    
 Determinant resid covariance  2.55E+44     
 Log likelihood -3041.561     
 Akaike information criterion  121.8651     
 Schwarz criterion  124.3651     
       
On the other 
hand, table 6.4 
(b) represents the 
results of panel 
VAR model 
which cover 
contribution of 
oil-and-gas as 
well. According 
to the table, in 
short, only a few 
      Note: *, ** and *** denote significance level of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s own creation 
 
 
116 
 
Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis is aimed to analyze expected impacts of accession to WTO on Azerbaijan 
economy. In the second chapter, a comprehensive analyze of WTO is done, purposed 
to ensure better understanding of this organization in terms of what may be expected 
or does the expectations in Azerbaijan, today, is possible to happen in case of its 
accession to WTO. After all, it is concluded that WTO is just an organization and all 
things are depend on the results of negotiations between states themselves. In this 
sense, accession to WTO should not be considered as a “miracle” to solve many 
problems in Azerbaijan economy.  
In the third chapter, I looked through previous research related to the impact of WTO 
on international trade and economies of the member countries and the impact of  
trade liberalization as a cause of WTO membership over economic growth 
performance of the countries. Many studies done by both critics and supporters of the 
organization are covered. However, there is not any commonly adopted view that the 
results of those studies differs regard to the approach, classification and type of the 
applied model.  
In the fourth chapter, I analyzed macroeconomic performance of Azerbaijan 
economy during the transition period with both oil-and-gas and none oil-and-gas 
context as well as the economy of Georgia and Armenia in before-and-after WTO 
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membership context. It is concluded that the dependence of Azerbaijan economy, 
especially export from oil-and-gas industry is seriously high and this will continue in 
the near future as well due to present oil and expected gas production. After 
discussing trends in Georgia and Armenia economies before-and-after WTO 
membership, graphically, I concluded that there an increase especially in export and 
import of this countries after their accession to WTO. However, the increase is 
considerable higher than the increase in export and this gap is seriously high.  
The fifth chapter was devoted to the discussing the data and methodology which has 
been used in this thesis. Here, I decided to use the case study and VAR model. VAR 
model was applied to the non-stationary and stationary (after differencing once) data 
for Georgia and Armenia,  individually, and panel data with and without the oil-and-
gas contribution. Therefore, eight different VAR model regression were defined to 
estimate which all included the binary variable               . In the sixth 
chapter, I interpreted the results and concluded that:  
For Georgia, with non-stationary or I(1) series of data, I found seriously significant 
and positive impacts of               . However, with non-stationary data 
attained after differencing once of the time series used in the previous model, I find 
statistically significant the impact of WTO membership only for yearly change in 
GDP growth which is positive. The impact for yearly change in import and export 
was found positive and negative, respectively, and statistically insignificant for both 
of them. Because the cointegration was unable to apply due to insufficient number of 
observations, results of the model with non-stationary series of data seems suspicious 
and consequently, results of the second one is taken as a basis in this analysis.  
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For Armenia, with non-stationary or original series of data, the impact of 
               was found statistically insignificant at all for all variables in the 
model. Interestingly, the sign of the coefficient is negative for all except the export. 
However, VAR model results for Armenia with stationary series of data achieved 
through differencing once the original data as well, the impact of 
               is found only statistically significant and positive for import and 
export which the impact over import is 2.15 times of the impact on export. The 
impact for GDP growth was found positive but statistically insignificant. Because of 
the same issue, I will take the results of the model for Armenia with stationary series 
of data as a basis in this analysis.  
For panel VAR models, with non-stationary series of data without contribution of 
oil-and-gas, the impact was found only statistically significant and positive for GDP 
growth. Remaining coefficients are all statistically insignificant and negative except 
for growth in net FDI flow. After differencing once to make the data stationary, all 
coefficients is found statistically insignificant which implies that WTO membership 
does not matter so much. In the panel VAR models with non-stationary data which 
also cover the contribution of oil-and-gas, the impact was found statistically 
significant and positive for only GDP growth. Interestingly, the coefficients at import 
is higher than at export which implies that WTO membership increases import much 
more than export but, none of them are statistically significant. In this model as well, 
after differencing once, none of the coefficients at WTO became statistically 
significant but, the coefficient at import still exceeds the coefficient at export. This 
also implies that WTO membership does not matter for economies of member 
countries so much. However, it increases import much more than export which 
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causes to the increasing of foreign trade deficit and is considered as “bad” in basic 
rules context of P. Krugman.  
7.1 To Join or Not to Join? Policy Recommendations for Azerbaijan 
Making a decision to join or not to join to WTO would have both advantages and 
disadvantages for the economy of Azerbaijan. Today, there are several expectations 
in Azerbaijan society from accession to WTO such as decreasing or eliminating of 
monopoly in the economy, developing non-oil sector, increasing non-oil export and 
etc. Moreover, WTO membership would ensure a status and become an indicator of 
integration and tendency to liberalization from the international view. Nevertheless, 
neither membership status, nor change in the view of international organizations 
should affect the joining decision as much as expected macroeconomic impacts did.  
Opposite to the expectations, membership does not solve the monopoly issue what 
we see in Armenia case. In addition, to take trade disputes to WTO DSB is not 
effective for a small developing economy such as Azerbaijan which is obvious from 
statistics of cases brought to DSB. Moreover, Azerbaijan will never use balance of 
payments concessions within at least next twenty years because of oil and gas export 
which always results trade surplus. Membership will not affect export seriously 
because, Azerbaijan’s export is mostly consisted of oil and gas which are not under 
the control of WTO. Revenues from oil and gas sector will always have an increasing 
pressure on Azerbaijan currency, manat which will make non-oil-and-gas export less 
competitive in international markets. 
On the other hand, import is a function of national income and after the membership, 
import may be expected to increase significantly in light of Azerbaijan’s increasing 
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GDP. Azerbaijan’s internal market still does not know enough what to do in case of 
strong competition from marketing experience, technology and cost of production 
perspectives. Especially, Azerbaijan’s agriculture sector is based on mostly 
individual farming which employs significant part of the labor force. In this sense, 
expectations on positive impacts of the WTO membership seems less rational.  
Empirical part of this thesis also failed to find enough evidence that the impact of 
WTO membership may be positive. Opposite, both graphical and empirical analysis 
produced the same results that the membership increases import considerable more 
than export. This raises the question why to join if a country will buy more than its 
selling after the accession. Moreover, expectations about increasing net FDI flow to 
the country is also failed to find enough evidence. In fact, FDI flow is not a direct 
function of WTO membership that the conditions to attract FDIs may be created 
without the accession.  
To conclude, there is not enough evidence to say that it is better for Azerbaijan 
economy to join to WTO. That is why, Azerbaijan must insist on its arguments in 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations and demonstrate that it can accomplish to its 
economic targets without WTO membership. Alternatives such as signing bilateral 
trade contracts out of the negotiations for WTO membership or establishing a special 
economic zone in accordance with world experience may be better for Azerbaijan 
economy that the membership at WTO.  
 
  
121 
 
REFERENCES 
Akhundov, A. (2012). Deputy Minister: Azerbaijan should not Cooperate with 
Armenia in Case of WTO Accession, TREND News Agency, Retrieved 
December http://en.trend.az/capital/business/2098163.html, (Reached at 
December 14, 2013). 
Alt, J. E., & Gilligan, M. (2000). The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor 
Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions, 
in Frieden, J. A., & Lake, D. A. International Political Economy: 
Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth,  Wadsworth/Thomson learning 
Inc., 327-342.  
Allee, T. L., & Scalera, J. E. (2012). The Divergent Effects of Joining International 
Organizations: Trade Gains and the Rigors of WTO Accession. International 
Organization. 64: 2, 243-276. 
Anderson, K. (2010). Can the WTO Reduce Agricultural Trade Distortions? The 
Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 19:1, 109-134. 
Aras, O. N., & Suleymanov, E. (2012). The Importance of Azerbaijan's Energy 
Revenues in its Exports Volume and the Effects on the National Economy, in 
International Conference on Eurasian Economies 11-13 October 2012 – 
Almaty, Kazakhstan, 225-232.  
122 
 
Aslund, A., Boone, P., & Johnson ,S. (1996). How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-
Communist Countries. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1, pp. 217-
312. 
Azerbaijan and WTO. (2013). http://wto.az (Reached atJuly 20, 2013) 
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (2003). Economic Theory and the Interpretation of 
GATT/WTO, August                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~rstaiger/econ.theory.gatt.wto.pdf(Reached at 
December 15, 2013)  
Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. (1999). An Economic Theory of GATT. American 
Economic Review, 89:1, 215-248.  
Balding, C. (2010). Joining the World Trade Organization: What is the Impact? 
Review of International Economics, 18: 1, 193-206.  
Bank, W. 
2013.http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/azerbaijan/projects/all?qterm=&la
ng_exact=English&os=20 (Reached at December 19, 2013) 
Bank, W. (2013).http://data.worldbank.org(Reached at July 2013) 
Bank, W. (2008). Privatization and Corruption: The World Bank and Azerbaijan. 
http://www.whistleblower.org/storage/documents/Privatization_and_Corrupti
on.pdf (Reached at May 22, 2013) 
123 
 
Bank, W. (1995). Statistical Handbook 1995: States of the Former USSR, World 
Bank, Studies of Economies in Transformation, December.  
Baranick, M. J., & Salayeva, R. (2005). State-Building in a Transition Period: The 
Case of Azerbaijan. The Cornwallis Group X: Analysis for New and 
Emerging Societal Conflict, p. 213.  
Bayramov, V. (2008). A Comparative Analysis of CIS Countries’ WTO Accession; 
Ways to European Integration. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRAD/Resources/Bayramov.pdf 
(Reached at July 14, 2013) 
Bayulgen, O. (2003). Facing the dilemma of global capitalism: the case of 
Azerbaijan. Central Asian Survey, 22: 2/3, June/September, p. 209. 
Boyarchuk, D. (2012). Azerbaijan’s Fiscal Policy after the Oil Boom. CASE Network 
E-briefsNo. 02/2012, Center for Social and Economic research (CASE).  
Bulut, C. (2007). The Evaluation of Azerbaijan’s WTO Accession. Gazi Üniversitesi 
Iktisadi ve Idari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. 9: 2, 59-73. 
Buthe, T., & Milner, H. V. (2008). The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into 
Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade 
Agreements? American Journal of Political Science, 52:4, 741-762.  
124 
 
CESD. (2012a). Azerbaijan may Join the WTO in 2013 if Government of Azerbaijan 
Speed up Membership Negotiations. http://cesd.az/new/2012/05/azerbaijan-
may-join-the-wto-in-2013/ (Reached at December 20, 2013) 
CESD. (2012b). What new WTO Negotiations Promise? 
http://cesd.az/new/2012/12/what-new-wto-negotiations-promise/(Reached at 
December 20, 2013) 
CESD. (2013). New WTO Accession Negotiations: New Hopes? 
http://cesd.az/new/2013/05/new-wto-accession-negotiations-new-
hopes/(Reached at November 20, 2013) 
Ciarreta, A., & Nasirov, S. (2012). Development Trends in the Azerbaijan Oil and 
Gas Sector: Achievements and Challenges. Energy Policy, 40, 282-292.  
CIA. (2013). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factbook/rankorder/2079rank.html (Reached at December 20, 2013) 
Chang, R., Kaltani, L., & Loayza, N. (2009). Openness can Be Good for Growth: 
The Role of Policy Complementarities. Journal of Development Economics. 
90: 1, 33-49. 
Chang, P., & Lee, M. (2011). The WTO Trade Effect. Journal of International 
Economics. 85: 1, 53–71.  
125 
 
Chorev. N. (2005). The Institutional Project of Neo-Liberal Globalism: The Case of 
the WTO. Theory and Society. 34:3, 317-355.   
Cornell, S. E., & Ismailzade, F. (2005). The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: 
Implications for Azerbaijan, in Starr, S. F., & Cornell, S. E. The Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & 
Silk Road Studies Program, 61-85.  
Dąbrowski, M. (2003). Disinflation Strategies in Transition Economies and Their 
Effectiveness, in Dabrowski, M. Disinflation in Transition Economies, 
Central European University Press.   
Dowrick, S., & Golley, J. (2004). Trade Openness and Growth: Who Benefits?  
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 20:1, 38-56 
Dudwick, N.,  Fock, K.& Sedik, D. (2007). Land Reform and Farm Restructuring in 
Transition Countries: The Experience of Bulgaria, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and 
Kazakhstan, World Bank Publications 
Dutt, P., Zandt, T. V., & Mihov, I. (2013), The Effect of WTO on the Extensive and 
the Intensive Margins of Trade, February. 
http://www.freit.org/WorkingPapers/Papers/TradePolicyMultilateral/FREIT5
15.pdf (Reached at December 14, 2014) 
126 
 
EBRD. Transition Report, 2005: Business in Transition. 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/TR05.pdf (Reached at 
June 10, 2013) 
Edwards, S. (1998). Openness, Productivity and Growth: What do We Really Know? 
The Economic Journal, 108:447, 383-398.  
Eicher, T. S., & Henn, C. (2011). In Search of WTO Trade Effects: Preferential 
Trade Agreements Promote Trade Strongly, but Unevenly. Journal of 
International Economics. 83: 2, 137–153. 
Eromenko, I. (2010). Accession to the WTO: Part I, Igor Eromenko & Ventus 
Publishing ApS. 
ESCAP. (2001). Accession to the World Trade Organization: Issues and 
Recommendations for Central Asian and Caucasian Economies in Transition, 
United Nations Publication.   
Escudero, S. T. (2009). Azerbaijan: A Strong Fiscal Policy, in Triller, E. Azerbaijan 
and the Global Economic Crisis: Sustaining Stability, Impact Azerbaijan, pp. 
8-12. 
Fieleke, N. S. (1995). The Uruguay Round of Negotiations: an Overview. New 
England Economic Review. May/June.  
127 
 
Fletcher, I. (2010). Dubious Assumptions of the Theory of Comparative Advantage. 
Real-World Economics Review. 54, 94-105. 
Ford, J. (2002). A Social Theory of Trade Regime Change: GATT to WTO. 
International Studies Review.4: 3, 115-138.  
Frankel, J. A., & Romer, D. (1996). Trade and Growth: An Empirical Investigation. 
Working Paper 5476, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
GATS. 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gats_01_e.htm#
article1A(Reached at July 20, 2013) 
GATT. (1994). 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_01_e.
htm#p (Reached at December 19, 2013) 
Gowa, J., & Kim, S. Y. (2005). An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the 
GATT on Trade, 1950-94. World Politics. 57: 4, 453-478. 
Grant, J. H., & Boys, K.A. (2012). Agricultural Trade and the GATT/WTO: Does 
Membership Make A Difference? American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 94: 1, 1-24. 
Gould, D. M., & Ruffin, R. J. (1996). Trade Deficits: Causes and Consequences. 
Economic and Financial Policy Review, (Q IV), 10-20.  
128 
 
Gujarat, D. N. (1995). Basic Econometrics. 3
rd
 edition, McGraw-Hill Inc.  
Guruli, I. (2012). Budgetary Expenses and State Debt in Georgia. 
http://dfwatch.net/budgetary-expenses-and-state-debt-in-georgia-27217 
(Reached at July 6, 2013) 
Harrison, A. (1996). Openness and Growth: A Time-series, Cross-country Analysis 
for Developing Countries. Journal of Development Economics. 48:2, 419-447.  
He, L. T. (2011). A Note on Impacts of International Trade on Economic Growth and 
Inflation. The International Trade Journal, 25:4, 418-432.  
Herz1, B., & Wagner, M. (2011). The “Real” Impact of GATT/WTO-A Generalized 
Approach. The World Economy. 34: 6, 1014-1041.   
Hoekman, B. (2002). The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles, in Hoekman, B., 
Mattoo, A. & English, P. Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook , 
World Bank Publications.   
Horn, H., Johannesson, L., & Mavroidis, P. (2011). The WTO Dispute Settlement 
System 1995‒2010: Some Descriptive Statistics. IFN Working Paper No. 891.  
IMF. (1997, 
December).http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9762.htm(Reached 
at July 15 2012) 
129 
 
Irwin, D. A. (1995). The GATT in Historical Perspective.  American Economic 
Review. 85: 2, 323-328.  
ITA. (2013). 
http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradeagreements/multilateral/wto/tg_ian_00206
9.asp (Reached at August 19, 2013) 
Islam, S., Hye, M. A., & Shahbaz, M. (2012). Import-Economic Growth Nexus: 
ARDL Approach to Cointegration. Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign 
Trade Studies. 5:3, 194-214. 
Ismailzade, F. (2005). Turkey-Azerbaijan: The Honeymoon is Over. 
http://www.turkishpolicy.com/images/stories/2005-04-neighbors/TPQ2005-4-
ismailzade.pdf(Reached at May 20, 2013) 
Jansen. M. (2010). Developing Countries, Standards and the WTO. The Journal of 
International Trade & Economic Development. 19:1, 163-185. 
Kavass, I. (2008). Azerbaijan’s Path toward WTO Accession: Political Concerns, 
Technical Difficulties, National Attitudes (1997-2006). An Essay in the Form 
of a Country Report, Review of Central and East European Law, 33: 3, 343-
384.    
Kaynak, E., & Nasirova, Z. (2005). The Transition Period of C.I.S. Economies: Oil-
Based Economic Development Strategy of Azerbaijan.  Journal of East-West 
Business, 10: 3. 31-51.  
130 
 
Kim, D-H. (2011). Trade, Growth and Income. The Journal of International Trade & 
Economic Development: An International and Comparative Review, 20:5, 
677-709.  
Kim, D-H., & Lin, S-C. (2009). Trade and Growth at Different Stages of Economic 
Development. Journal of Development Studies, 45: 8, 1211–1224.  
Kiyota, K. (2012). Trade Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Income Distribution 
in A Multiple-cone Neoclassical Growth Model. Oxford Economic Papers. 
64:4, 655-674.  
Kim, M. H. (2008). Does the WTO Promote Trade? Further Evidence. The Journal 
of International Trade & Economic Development. 19:3, 421-437.  
Konya, L., Matyas, L., & Harris, M. (2011). GATT/WTO Membership Does 
Promote International Trade After All-Some New Empirical Evidence, 
Working Paper 2011/05. Central European University.  
Lee, J. (1995). Capital Goods Imports and Long-Run Growth. Journal of 
Development Economics. 48:1, 91-110.  
Lermana, Z. (2000). Agriculture in Transition Economies: From Common Heritage 
to Divergence.  Agricultural Economics. 26: 2, p. 96. 
Liu, X. (2009). GATT/WTO Promotes Trade Strongly: Sample Selection and Model 
Specification. Review of International Economics. 17: 3, 428-446.   
131 
 
Mansfield, E. D., & Reinhardt, E. (2008). International Institutions and the Volatility 
of International Trade. International Organization. 62:4, 621-652. 
Markovic, I. (2009). How to Join the World Trade Organization: Some Aspects of 
the Accession Process. Economic Annals. 54: 180, 118-119.   
Matsushita, M. (2004). Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of Competition 
Policy, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 3:2, 363-385.  
Michalopoulos, C. (2000). World Trade Organization Accession for Transition 
Economies: Problems and Prospects. Russian and East European Finance 
and Trade, 36: 2, 63-86.  
Oatley, T. (2008), International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the 
Global Economy, Pearson Education, Inc. 
Ognivtsev, V., Jounela, E., & Tang, X. (2001). Accession to the WTO: The Process 
and Selected Issues, in WTO Accessions and Development Policies, United 
Nations Publication, 172-229.  
Pacheco-López, P., & Thirlwall, A. P. (2007). Trade Liberalization and the Trade-
Off Between Growth and the Balance of Payments in Latin America. 
International Review of Applied Economics, 21: 4, 469-490.  
Park, W. G. (2009). Does the WTO Matter? A Non-parametric View, Working Paper 
Series, No. 2009-06. Economics Department, American University.  
132 
 
Papava ,V. (2009). Georgia’s Economy: Post-Revolutionary Development and Post-
War Difficulties. Central Asian Survey. 28: 2, 199-213.  
Pauwelyn, J. (2005). The Transformation of World Trade. Michigan Law Review. 
104: 1, 1-70. 
Rahim, S. (1999). What Use is the Neo-Classical Theory of International Trade? The 
Lahore Journal of Economics, 4: 1, 89-114.  
Reis, R. A. (2009). The World Trade Organization, Infobase Publishing. 
Rivera-Batiz, L. A., & Xie, D. (1992). GATT, Trade, and Growth. American 
Economic Review. 82:2, 422-427. 
Rose, A. K. (2004a). Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? The 
American Economic Review. 104: 1, 98-114. 
Rose, A. K. (2004b). Does The WTO Make Trade More Stable? Working Paper 
10207. National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Rose, A. K. (2004c). Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy? Journal of 
International Economics. 63: 2, 209-235. 
Roy, J. (2011). Is the WTO Mystery Really Solved? Economics Letters. 113, 127-
130. 
133 
 
Santos-Paulino, A. (2005). Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance: Theory 
and Evidence for Developing Countries. The World Economy, 28: 6, 783-821. 
Santos-Paulino, A., & Thirlwall, A. P. (2004). The Impact of Trade Liberalization on 
Exports, Imports and the Balance of Payments of Developing Countries. The 
Economic Journal, 114:493, 50-72.  
Shafaeddin, M. (2010). The Political Economy of WTO with Special Reference to 
NAMA Negotiations. European Journal of Development Research. 22: 2, 
175-196.  
Schumacher, R. (2012). Adam Smith’s Theory of Absolute Advantage and the Use 
of Doxography in the History of Economics. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy 
and Economics, 5: 2, 54-80. 
Shah, S. H., Hasnat, H., & Li, J. (2010). Pre and Post WTO Analysis of South Asian 
Economies: Evidence from Panel Data Estimation. MPRA Paper No. 35634, 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35634/1/MPRA_paper_35634.pdf (Reached 
at December 10, 2013).  
Smith , J. L. (2009). The 2008 Oil Price Shock: Markets or Mayhem?RFF Policy 
Commentary Series. http://www.rff.org/Publications/WPC/Pages/The-2008-
Oil-Price-Shock-Markets-or-Mayhem.aspx (Reached at August 22, 2013) 
Smith, P. A. (2001). Azerbaijan: Second Oil Boom Predicted. The Middle East, No. 
314, July/August.  
134 
 
Snidal, D. (1985). The limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. International 
Organization. 39: 4, 579- 580.  
SOCAR (2013).http://new.socar.az/socar/az/economics-and-statistics/economics-
and-statistics/oil-production (Reached at December 18, 2013) 
SOCAR. http://new.socar.az/socar/az/economics-and-statistics/economics-and-
statistics/oil-production(Reached at July 26, 2013) 
SOFAZ. (2011). Annual Report 2011. 
http://www.oilfund.az/uploads/annual_2011en.pdf(Reached at December 5, 
2013) 
Soyak, A., & Nesirova, Z. (2003). The Consequences of IMF's Policies in the 
Globalization Process: The Case of Azerbaijan,  Munich Personal RePEc 
Archive,http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2909/(Reached at August 23, 2013) 
Srinivasan, T. N. (2005). Nondiscrimination in GATT/WTO: Was There Anything to 
Begin with and Is There Anything Left? World Trade Review, 4: 1, 69-95. 
SPSEDR (2004). 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan016803.pdf 
(Reached at December 19, 2013) 
135 
 
Staff, D. (2012). Georgia’s Foreign Debt has Tripled in Five Years. Retrieved July 
15, 2013, fromhttp://dfwatch.net/georgias-foreign-debt-has-tripled-in-five-
years-49820(Reached at July 15, 2013) 
CIA (2013). https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2079rank.html (Reached at December 10, 2013) 
Subramanian, A., & Wei, S-J. (2007). The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but 
Unevenly. Journal of International Economics. 72: 2, 151-175.  
Suleymanov, E. (2008). The Cooperation Strategy of IMF with Azerbaijan Republic 
after Independence with Market Economy Process. Journal of Qafqaz 
University, November 24, 169-179.  
Swinnen, J., Olper, A., & Vandemoortele, T. (2012). Impact of the WTO on 
Agricultural and Food Policies. World Economy. 35:9, pp. 1089-1101. 
Taymas, Z. (1993). Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum: From Crisis to 
Sustained Growth.  World Bank Report No. 117.  
Thomas, J. (2006). Property Rights, Land Fragmentation and the Emerging Structure 
of Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries. Journal of 
Agricultural and Development Economics. 3: 2, 225-275.  
Tomz, M. Goldstein, J.L., & Rivers, D. (2007a), Do We Really Know That the WTO 
Increases Trade? Comment. American Economic Review, 93: 5, 2005-2018. 
136 
 
Tomz, M., Rivers, D., & Goldstein, J. L. (2007b). Institutions in International 
Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World 
Trade. International Organization.61:1, 37-67. 
TRIPS. 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_e.htm(Rea
ched at August 15, 2013) 
USITC. (2003). The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, US-
Israel FTA, US-Canada FTA, NAFTA and the Uruguay Round on the US 
economy. Publication 3621. 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3621.pdf (Reached at December 
19, 2013).   
Walter, A. (1996). The United States and Western Europe: The Theory of 
Hegemonic Stability, in Woods, N. Explaining International Relations Since 
1945. Oxford University Press, 1996, 126-154.  
Wangdi, K. (2010). To Join or Not to Join WTO: A Study on its Negative Impacts. 
Journal of Bhutan Studies. 23, Winter, 55-117. 
Williams, P. J. (2008). Handbook on Accession to the WTO, Cambridge University 
Press.  
Winters, L. A. (2004). Trade Liberalization and Economic Performance: An 
Overview. The Economic Journal, 114:493, 4-21.  
137 
 
WTO. (2004). A handbook on the WTO Dispute System, Cambridge University Press. 
WTO (2011), Understanding of WTO. WTO Publication. 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf(Rea
ched at December 15, 2013)  
WTO. (2012). World Trade Report 2012, WTO Publications.   
Yunusov, A. (2001). Twenty Years of Independence in Azerbaijan, in South 
Caucasus 20 Years of Independence, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 60-77.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
